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Preface 
This thesis presents three studies that explore the limits of perceptual long-term memory. 
All three studies were published in peer-reviewed journals over the last two years. They are 
reproduced in the accepted version with permission from the publishers. The contributions 
of the co-authors to the three studies are shown on page five. The reference lists of the three 
studies were integrated into one combined reference list at the end of this thesis. Apart from 
that, the manuscripts of the three studies have remained unchanged. 
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1. Introduction 
Right now, I am sitting in my office, desperately trying to write the introduction to my thesis. 
As I cannot come up with the next sentence, I look out of the window. My gaze wonders. I 
see a tree, the branches and leaves gently dancing in the wind, I see parked cars and parts of 
the university buildings, I see people passing by and craftsmen unloading materials from 
their van. At the same time, I am taking a sip from my cup of coffee. Then, still not knowing 
what to write, I scratch my head and fumble around with the pen in my hands. My fingers 
are gliding over the keyboard without pressing a key. When I finally have an idea that I 
consider worth typing down, my colleague enters the office, accompanied by a student. 
While they are talking about an upcoming study, going through different materials spread 
out on the table in front of them, I focus on my computer screen and try to ignore everything 
else. I write the following: 
 We have thousands upon thousands of perceptual experiences every day. The precise 
number is hard to estimate. Assuming that a third of a second is a sufficient amount of time 
to have a perceptual experience, and that we continuously have experiences during eight 
hours a day, one can calculate that a 50-year-old person has had 1,577,880,000 perceptual 
experiences in his or her life (see, Burnham, 1888).1 To get a better feeling for this ungrasp-
able number, one could also say that we have 180 experiences per minute or 10,800 experi-
ences per hour. Although such an estimate can do nothing but to provide us with a vague 
rule of thumb, it gives us an impression of the amount of perceptual information that we 
process day in and day out. What will I remember from this perceptual input, though? What 
will I remember from the things that I have seen when looking outside my office window or 
from the things that I have touched while thinking about the next sentence? Or, asking more 
generally, how many of our perceptual experiences are stored in long-term memory – and 
how detailed are the stored memory representations? Exploring and trying to answer this 
question has intrigued generations of researchers. It has been speculated from early on that 
almost every experience is permanently stored in memory (e.g., Tetens, 1777; see also 
Dudai, 1997). At the same time, numerous researchers have pointed to the obvious limita-
tions of human memory such as capacity limits for storing information.  
                                                          
1 Note, that Burnham (1888) does not use the word ‘experience’, but writes that it has been 
assumed that a third of a second is sufficient “for the production of one idea” (p. 72), a phrase 
that rather seems to refer to thoughts than to perceptual experiences. However, the calcula-
tion reported above can be used for estimating the number of perceptual experiences as well. 
That one only makes experiences during eight hours per day was an assumption made to 
account for “sleep, etc.” (p. 72). 
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Against this background, the first section of the introduction briefly reviews argu-
ments against detailed memory representations in perceptual long-term memory, anecdotal 
evidence supporting the idea that humans may be able to store more information than com-
monly assumed, and previous studies demonstrating that memories stored in perceptual 
long-term memory are indeed more durable and more detailed than previously believed. As 
the existing studies are almost exclusively studies on visual long-term memory, the question 
arises whether the results obtained for visual long-term memory hold true for other sensory 
modalities. Thus, the goal of Study 1 was to investigate the quantity and quality of infor-
mation stored in haptic long-term memory. 
 Exploring the similarities and differences between the sensory modalities when it 
comes to storing perceptual experiences is only one way of approaching the question of how 
many of the perceptual experiences we make are stored in long-term memory. Another way 
of doing this is to consider the role of attention. It is commonly accepted that the processing 
of attended information is enhanced compared to the processing of unattended information 
(for a review, see Serences & Kastner, 2014). Thus, I will probably be better at recalling the 
color of the parked cars in front of my window I have attentively looked at than at recalling 
the color of the dress of the student my colleague was talking to while I was trying to focus 
on writing this introduction. What happens to the unattended information, though? As de-
scribed in the second section of the introduction, it is argued that unattended information is 
filtered out at some stage of the processing hierarchy, leaving no trace in long-term memory, 
at least if the attentional resources are fully exhausted. Simply put, I may remember the color 
of the student’s dress, but only if I did not manage to focus completely on working on the 
introduction. Study 2 was designed to challenge this assumption and to demonstrate detailed 
long-term memory for unattended, irrelevant, and incidentally encoded auditory infor-
mation. In addition, Study 2 investigated whether the finding that detailed perceptual long-
term representations are stored for visual as well as for haptically explored material (as 
demonstrated in Study1) can also be extended to auditory information. 
 As the introductory paragraph has illustrated, we permanently make perceptual ex-
periences with all our senses: vision and hearing as well as touch, smell, and taste. However, 
as already briefly mentioned above, most research about perceptual long-term memory is 
research about visual long-term memory. More generally speaking, vision is the most studied 
sensory modality. This bias towards vision needs an explanation. Study 3 attempts to pro-
vide such an explanation, or rather: to weigh different explanations against each other. The 
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theoretical background for this study is sketched in the third section of the introduction. The 
fourth section summarizes the research questions. 
 
1.1 The Quantity and Quality of Information Stored in Perceptual Long-Term Memory 
The introductory paragraphs used the term ‘perceptual experience’ without defining it. So 
what is a perceptual experience? First, a perceptual experience is not the same as a sensation. 
While ‘sensation’ refers to the detection of stimuli in the environment by the receptors of 
our senses as well as the transduction of this stimulation into electrical impulses, ‘perception’ 
refers to the process of interpreting sensory information to understand and to represent the 
outside world (see, e.g., Goldstein, 2010). Second, a perceptual experience is not necessarily 
a conscious experience. When riding a bike over a bumpy road, for instance, you will be 
aware of the fact that you need to balance yourself in order not to fall down. The incoming 
information used to achieve this, and the perceptions that lead to a specific motor action, 
normally remain beyond conscious awareness. Thus, a perceptual experience is the con-
scious or unconscious perception of stimuli from our environment. In this context, perceptual 
long-term memory can be defined as long-term memory for the perceptual aspects of infor-
mation reaching our senses in contrast to the semantic or conceptual aspects, no matter 
whether we are consciously aware of the stored perceptual information or not (see, e.g., 
Schacter, 1990; Johnson, 1983; 2007). To give an illustrative example, perceptual memory 
is memory for the shape or the color of the cars parked in front of my window; it is memory 
for the perceptual features of these cars as well as the combination of these features. Re-
membering or recognizing the brand or even the specific product line of the car is not part 
of perceptual memory, but part of semantic or conceptual memory. Bearing this in mind the 
question arises: What is stored in long-term memory from current sensations on a perceptual 
level?2 
 At first, one may point to some of the obvious limitations of human visual perception 
and perceptual memory. Let us begin with the physiological constraints: While we have the 
impression of perceiving a rich and detailed world, only a fraction of our visual field is rep-
resented in high resolution, while non-foveated, peripheral information is represented in re-
duced fidelity (see, e.g., Cohen, Dennett, & Kanwisher, 2016; Rosenholtz, 2011). Apart from 
                                                          
2 Note, that the following remarks are almost exclusively based on studies and observations 
involving visual memory. This is simply because most studies on perceptual memory are 
studies on visual perceptual memory. The reasons for this are discussed in Study 3. Studies 
1 and 2 can be seen as attempts to gain insight into the functioning of haptic (Study 1) and 
auditory (Study 2) perceptual long-term memory. 
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this, there seem to be limits for processing and remembering perceptual information at the 
different stages of visual processing. Take iconic memory, for instance: It has been demon-
strated that humans are capable of storing incoming visual information in high resolution for 
a very short time only – a couple hundred of milliseconds (Sperling, 1960). While the im-
mediate sensory impression remains visible after the stimulus has disappeared for about 80-
100 ms (visible persistence; Di Lollo, 1980), a non-visible sensory trace containing the in-
formational value of the input is stored for about 150-300 ms (informational persistence; 
Irwin & Yeomans, 1986). The information that has not faded away after the first couple 
hundred of milliseconds can be transferred to visual working memory, which enables us to 
actively maintain information for several seconds in order to deal with ongoing tasks (e.g., 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 2008; Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014).  
However, the resources of visual working memory are believed to be severely lim-
ited. While the proponents of fixed slot models (see, e.g., Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Drew 
& Vogel, 2008; Luck & Vogel, 1997; 2013; Zhang, & Luck, 2008) assume that visual work-
ing memory capacity is restricted to maintaining a small and fixed number of objects, such 
as Cowan’s (2001) ‘magical number four’ (for more recent capacity estimates see, e.g., Fran-
coneri, Alvarez, & Enns, 2007; Howe, Cohen, Pinto, & Horowitz, 2010), proponents of con-
tinuous resource models have tried to demonstrate that visual working memory capacity is 
not so much restricted by the number of objects but by the amount of information, which 
can be retained (see, e.g., Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays & Husain, 2008; Franconeri, 
Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2013; Wilken & Ma, 2004). Although there is an ongoing debate 
about which kind of model provides a better description of visual working memory capacity, 
and although a new kind of model emerged over the past few years, trying to provide a 
middle ground between slot and resource models (so-called flexible slot models, see, e.g., 
Dyrholm, Kyllingsbæk, Espeseth, & Bundesen, 2011; Sims, Jacobs, & Knill, 2012; van den 
Berg, Awh, & Ma, 2014) all models share the assumption that only a fraction of the incoming 
perceptual information can be actively maintained.  
If perceptual memory is already limited at the earlier processing stages, it seems plau-
sible to speculate that perceptual long-term memory is also limited. This consideration is 
supported by two related phenomena: change blindness and inattentional amnesia. The term 
‘change blindness’ refers to the fact that observers often miss even significant changes within 
a visual scene, when the presentation of the changed and the unchanged version of the scene 
is either briefly interrupted (O’Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 
1997) or the change occurs gradually (Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000). This has been 
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taken as evidence that “observers never form a complete, detailed representation of their 
surroundings” (Rensink et al., 1997, p. 368; for reviews on change blindness see, e.g., Jen-
sen, Yao, Street, & Simons, 2011; Rensink, 2002; 2008; Simons & Ambinder, 2005).3 The 
second phenomenon, inattentional amnesia, is linked to the same limitations of human per-
ception and memory, but in a slightly different manner: When observing a scene, people 
miss parts of the very scene they are not attending to. In probably the most famous study on 
the topic, participants were asked to count the number of times a basketball was passed but 
while doing so, they did not notice that a person in a gorilla costume was walking through 
the scene (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Taken together, the above-mentioned theories and the 
observations regarding change blindness and inattentional amnesia have “led to the widely 
accepted idea that memory representations for real-world stimuli are impoverished and 
lacked [sic] visual detail” (Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2011, p. 14). Everything that was said 
so far is summarized by Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, and Oliva (2008) as follows: “[W]ithin a 
few hundred milliseconds of perceiving an image, sensory memory confers a truly photo-
graphic experience, enabling you to report any of the image details. Seconds later, short-
term memory enables you to report only sparse details from the image. Days later, you might 
be able to report only the gist of what you had seen” (p. 14325). 
 However, the view that only the gist of prior perceptual input is stored in perceptual 
long-term memory can be challenged in two ways. First, by pointing to anecdotal evidence 
reporting exceptional memory abilities for at least some humans. Second, by considering 
empirical evidence accumulated over the last decade. Let us begin with the anecdotal evi-
dence. One group of people that has been associated with exceptional memory abilities are 
savants (for an overview see, e.g., Happé & Frith, 2009; Treffert, 1989; 2009; Treffert & 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, the argument that phenomena like change blindness and inattentional amne-
sia demonstrate that observers never form a complete, detailed representation of their sur-
roundings has been questioned for at least two reasons. First, it has been noted that “the 
existence of change blindness does not on its own necessitate sparse representations – it 
could occur even with fairly detailed and complete visual representations of a scene” (Si-
mons & Rensink, 2005, p. 18). Second, there are a number of studies demonstrating that 
participants may be able to detect changes in a visual scene although they are explicitly 
unaware of this ability (see, e.g., Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2000; 2003; Laloyaux, De-
strebecqz, & Cleeremans, 2006; Laloyaux, Devue, Doyen, David, & Cleeremans, 2008; 
Thornton & Fernandez-Duque, 2000). In other words, relying on explicit reports may under-
estimate the fidelity of representations in human perceptual memory. 
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Wallace, 2002): Savants are people that show brilliant skills in one domain while being se-
verely limited in (all) other intellectual domains.4 Often, the outstanding, brilliant skill of 
savants is a memory skill. Kim Peek, for instance, was able to memorize a book page by 
heart in about eight to ten seconds (Treffert & Christensen, 2005). Another famous example 
for savant skills is Stephen Wiltshire, who is able to create extremely accurate and extremely 
detailed drawings of what he has seen before – and not only from small-range visual scenes, 
but even from whole cities (Sacks, 1995). The reasons for these outstanding abilities are still 
debated: While some argue that savants have a detail-focused processing bias (Happé & 
Vital, 2009), others believe that they are outstandingly good at recognizing repeating pat-
terns and show a general tendency towards sensory hypersensitivity (Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, 
Ashwin, Tavassoli, & Chakrabarti, 2009; Mottron, Dawson, & Soulières, 2009). In fact, it 
seems likely that different people with savant skills may profit from interindividually vary-
ing mechanisms so that the term ‘savant’ should perhaps rather be seen as an umbrella term, 
encompassing different kinds of outstanding abilities (see, e.g., Grandin, 2009, for a personal 
account). 
There are at least two more groups of people who have been associated with excellent 
perceptual memory skills: people with a so-called highly superior autobiographical memory 
(HSAM) and people with eidetic memory. In short, individuals with HSAM show “the ability 
to recall accurately vast amounts of remote salient autobiographical events without the ex-
plicit use of mnemonics” (LePort, Stark, McCaugh, & Stark, 2016, p. 1; see also LePort et 
al., 2012; LePort, Stark, McCaugh, & Stark, 2017; Parker, Cahill, & McCaugh, 2006; Patihis 
et al., 2013). A. J., the first person who was reported having HSAM skills describes her 
memory abilities as follows: “I think about the past all the time … It’s like a running movie 
that never stops. It’s like a split screen. I’ll be talking to someone and seeing something else 
…” (quoted in Parker et al., 2006, p. 35). Interestingly, individuals with HSAM do not show 
any advantage over age-and sex-matched controls on standard working memory tests (Le-
Port et al., 2012; LePort et al., 2017). Thus, what distinguishes individuals with HSAM from 
people with average memory skills seems to be the ability to explicitly remember more in-
formation over a longer period of time rather than the ability to attentively process more 
information in the present moment (LePort et al., 2016). Additionally, the advantage regard-
ing the remembering of information seems not to apply to just any kind of information, but 
                                                          
4 Savant syndrome is often associated with autistic spectrum disorders. Note, however, that 
“not all autistic persons have savant syndrome and not all persons with savant syndrome 
have autistic disorder” (Treffert, 2009, p. 1353). 
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“relatively selectively, [to the] recollection of personal, autobiographical material” (LePort 
et al., 2017, p. 276). Possible explanations for this advantage are still discussed, ranging 
from neuroanatomical differences (LePort et al., 2012) over the extensive, almost obsessive 
rehearsal of autobiographical information (LePort et al., 2016) to the use of special recon-
structive processes and strategies (Patihis et al., 2013). 
 Most research on eidetic memory was conducted in the 1960s and 1970s and explored 
the eidetic memory skills of children (for a review of these efforts see Haber, 1979; for a 
critical discussion of some key issues see also Giray, Altkin, Roodin, & Vaught, 1977; Gray 
& Gummerman, 1975; for the rare case of an adult eidetiker see Stromeyer, 1970; Stromeyer 
& Psotka, 1970, but see also Blakemore, Braddick, & Gregory, 1970 and Merritt, 1979 for 
a critical discussion of the case). Depending on the study, between 2 and 15 percent of ele-
mentary-school-aged children have been found to possess eidetic memory skills (Haber, 
1979), that is, the ability to continue seeing an image for up to several minutes after the 
physical stimulus has been removed. Then, the image starts to fade away gradually. It seems 
that eidetic memory is more frequent in younger than in older children (Richardson & Harris, 
1986; but see Haber & Haber, 1988), an age trend for which different reasons have been 
discussed. While it is possible that eidetic memory fulfills a developmental role as it enables 
children to inspect and rehearse a visual stimulus for a longer time before transferring it to 
long-term memory (Giray et al., 1977), one could also assume that the ability is “a leftover 
from an earlier less-differentiated level of cognitive organization” (Richardson & Harris, 
1986, p. 307). Put another way, children’s perception of the world may be less driven by a 
top-down modulated, conceptual mindset; instead, children may put greater emphasis on the 
perceptual dimension of the incoming information (Searleman & Herrmann, 1994; for a re-
cent study see Plebanek & Sloutsky, 2017). 
All the groups described above differ in some respect from what is considered ‘nor-
mal’ or at least ‘average’. Thus, it remains unclear what exactly can be learned from exam-
ples of people with extraordinary memory skills. Their skills may be ‘extraordinary’ in the 
sense that those people are capable of doing something most others are absolutely unable to 
do, that is, that they possess abilities that differ qualitatively from those of ‘normal’, average 
adults. However, it is also possible that the ‘extraordinary’ memory skills are not that ex-
traordinary after all, and that the difference is rather quantitative than qualitative. In this 
context, one may speculate, for instance, that the enhanced perceptual processing observed 
in people with savant skills (see above) may be present in all of us at least to a certain degree, 
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that is, that our more conceptual processing style masks our perceptual abilities, and that we 
do in fact store more detailed memories of the perceptual input than previously believed. 
 As it seems impossible to draw any clear-cut conclusions from the anecdotal obser-
vations presented here, it is advisable to take a closer look at the available empirical evidence 
that has accumulated over the last decades (for a review, see, e.g., Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 
2011). Landmark studies from the late 1960s and early 1970s have demonstrated that hu-
mans are able to store huge quantities of visual information (Shepard, 1967; Standing, 1973; 
Standing, Conezio, & Haber, 1970). In his seminal study, Standing (1973) presented 10,000 
colored images over five consecutive days at a rate of 5 seconds per picture and with an 
interstimulus interval of 600 milliseconds to his participants. Based on the performance of 
the participants in a memory test two days after the presentation of the images, it was esti-
mated that participants successfully remembered about 6,600 of the presented 10,000 pic-
tures. These results “have led many to infer that the number of visual items that can be stored 
in long-term memory is effectively unlimited” (Brady et al., 2011, p. 13). However, the stud-
ies mentioned so far only allow for conclusions regarding the quantity and not so much for 
conclusions regarding the fidelity or quality of the stored representations. 
 This has changed during the last decade (see, e.g., Brady et al., 2008; Hollingworth, 
2004, 2005; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Vogt & Magnussen, 2007). In a study con-
ducted by Vogt and Magnussen (2007), for instance, participants viewed 400 pictures of 
doors for 5 seconds each. Memory for these pictures was tested at four different time inter-
vals ranging from thirty minutes to one week, with a two-alternative forced choice test 
(2AFC) consisting of a picture that had been presented in the study phase and a novel picture. 
Crucially, for half of the participants, not the original, but an edited version of the pictures 
was used during study and test. In the edited version, all features of the pictures unrelated to 
the doors (such as signs, doorbell panels, etc.) were removed. However, memory was sig-
nificantly better for the original pictures, demonstrating that participants did not only store 
the gist of the images. 
These results were confirmed and extended by Brady et al. (2008): Participants 
viewed 2,500 categorically distinct everyday objects for 3 seconds each. Memory for these 
objects was tested in a 2AFC in one of three conditions: in the novel condition (comparable 
to the test used by Standing, 1973), participants had to indicate which of two different objects 
they had seen before (e.g., a bar of soap or an apple); in the exemplar condition, participants 
had to choose between two objects from the same basic-level category (e.g., two apples); in 
the state condition, participants had to choose between two states of the same object (e.g., a 
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complete apple or an apple from which someone has taken a bite). Participants performed 
comparably well in all three conditions (novel: 93% correct, exemplar: 88%, state: 87%), 
indicating that visual long-term memory has a massive storage capacity for object details. 
These results were replicated for shorter presentation times (Brady, Konkle, Oliva, & Alva-
rez, 2009) and when the images were unattended (Kuhbandner, Rosas-Corona, & 
Spachtholz, 2017), as well as for different stimulus material such as visual scenes (Konkle, 
Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010) and movements (Urgolites & Wood, 2013). 
While these studies have shown that representations in visual perceptual long-term 
memory are more detailed than previously believed and that humans seem to store more than 
the gist of incoming visual information, relatively little is known about perceptual long-term 
memory for perceptual information from other modalities such as touch (for the reasons 
behind this see the third section of the introduction as well as Study 3). Most existing studies 
on haptic long-term memory used retention intervals in the range of several minutes (see, 
e.g., Ballesteros, Reales, & Manga, 1999; Ballesteros & Reales, 2004; Craddock & Lawson, 
2008; Gadelha, Fernández-Calvo, Ferreira, de Jesus Marques, & dos Santos, 2016; Sebas-
tián, Reales, & Ballesteros, 2011). However, it seems that memory for haptically explored 
objects prevails for at least one week (Pensky, Johnson, Haag, & Homa, 2008). Thus, one 
may speculate that the quantity of information that can be stored in haptic long-term memory 
is effectively unlimited – just like the quantity of information that can be stored in visual 
long-term memory. Nonetheless, it is important to find out more about the fidelity of infor-
mation stored in haptic long-term memory: Demonstrating that perceptual experiences in 
other sensory modalities – such as touch – are stored in similar quantity and quality as visual 
experiences, would challenge existing models on the functioning of human memory, which 
assume that that perceptual long-term memory representations are rather sparse and that 
most perceptual input is rapidly forgotten (see, e.g., Brady et al., 2008). Thus, Study 1 ex-
plored the limits of haptic long-term memory regarding the durability and fidelity of memory 
representations. Additionally, Study 1 investigated the effects of incidental encoding on the 
quality of the stored memory representations as well as the limits of crossmodal transfer, 
that is, the ability to recognize haptically explored objects in a visual memory test. 
 
1.2 The Fate of Unattended Information 
Remember the scene described in the beginning of the introduction: In every moment of our 
lives, we are confronted with a vast amount of sensory information. Due to the limits of 
human cognition, we are not capable of processing all of this information intensively. The 
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means by which we actively select the information that needs to be processed in a given 
moment is attention (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2017). What is attention? According to William 
James (1890/1950), the answer is quite simple: 
Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear 
and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It 
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others […]. (p. 
403-404) 
Expressed more technically, attention helps us to respond quickly and accurately to the rel-
evant stimuli in our environment while ignoring the irrelevant rest (for classic experimental 
evidence see, e.g., Egly, Driver & Rafal, 1994; Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978). Which 
stimuli we consider to be relevant depends on our current goals and individual interests (e.g., 
Castelhano & Henderson, 2008; Noton & Stark, 1971; Yarbus, 1967) as well as our prior 
knowledge (e.g., Võ & Henderson, 2009), but also on the salience of the stimuli (e.g., Theeu-
wes, 1992). 
 Thus, the enhanced processing of attended compared to unattended information 
seems to be commonly accepted (for a review, see, e.g., Serences & Kastner, 2014). But 
what about the unattended information? Will I remember the dress of the student my col-
league was talking to while I was trying to focus on writing this introduction – or will all the 
information about her dress be pushed into oblivion because I did not attend to it? In short, 
models of selective attention strongly lean towards the second option, that is, they state that 
unattended information is filtered out at some stage of the processing hierarchy and thus not 
stored in long-term memory – at least if the attentional load is high enough, that is, if the 
attentional resources are fully exhausted (see, e.g., Lavie, 2005, 2010; for a more extended 
discussion of the differences between early and late selection models see the introduction of 
Study 2). Study 2 was designed to challenge this assumption by demonstrating that detailed 
memory representations are stored in perceptual long-term memory even when the incoming 
perceptual information is completely unattended, irrelevant for the current task, and inci-
dentally encoded. Together with Study 1, Study 2 challenges common assumptions about 
perceptual long-term memory. First, the assumption that perceptual long-term memory rep-
resentations are rather sparse, that is, that they lack detail and contain only the gist of the 
incoming perceptual information. Second, the assumption that storing detailed perceptual 
long-term memory representations is an effortful process that crucially depends on the allo-
cation of attention to the stimuli as well as the intention to memorize them. Thus, showing 
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that detailed memory representations are stored as a natural product of perception would 
challenge common models of memory storage and retrieval. 
 
1.3 Perception and Memory Are (Not) All About Vision 
If you open the textbook on Sensation and Perception by Goldstein and Brockmole (2017) 
and take a look at the table of contents, you will realize that six chapters are explicitly dedi-
cated to vision (“Perceiving Objects and Scenes”, “Visual Attention”, “Taking Action”, 
“Perceiving Motion”, “Perceiving Color”, “Perceiving Depth and Size”), while three are 
dedicated to hearing (“Hearing”, “Hearing II: Location and Organization”, “Speech Percep-
tion”), one to touch (“The Cutaneous Senses”), and one to taste and smell combined (“The 
Chemical Senses”). Interestingly, four more chapters that are meant to explain some general 
principles about sensation and perception (“Introduction to Perception”, “The Beginning of 
the Perceptual Process”, “Neural Processing”, “Cortical Organization”), almost exclusively 
use examples from vision to illustrate these principles and could thus be counted as “visual” 
chapters as well. No matter whether counting the number of chapters or the number of pages 
dedicated to each sensory modality (vision: 166 pages or 256 when counting the first four 
chapters as visual chapters, hearing: 78 pages, touch: 24 pages, taste and smell: 23 pages), 
the conclusion remains the same: The part of the book dealing with aspects of vision is longer 
than the part of the book dealing with all other sensory modalities combined. 
This bias towards vision is not a peculiarity of the book by Goldstein and Brockmole 
(2017), but can be found in many – if not all – other textbooks on perception and perceptual 
memory (see, e.g., Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2017). How-
ever, the dominance of the visual is not even restricted to psychology textbooks or research 
on perceptual memory (see Gallace & Spence, 2009), but can be found in everyday life as 
well. Take the regulations for private accident insurance companies in Germany, for in-
stance, as published by the German Insurance Federation (Gesamtverband der Deutschen 
Versicherungswirtschaft, 2019). After an accident, the degree of disability is evaluated (0-
100%). As the German Insurance Federation explains, the degree of disability depends on 
how much a certain disability affects ‘everyday performance’. The insurance company has 
to pay the respective fraction of the sum insured. The regulation states the following degrees 
of disability for the loss of the different senses: both eyes: 100%, one eye: 50%, hearing in 
both ears: 60%, hearing in one ear: 30%, smell: 10%, taste: 5%. The sense of touch is not 
explicitly mentioned in this list. However, this should probably not be taken as evidence that 
the loss of touch would not significantly impair peoples’ lives. Rather, it may simply be 
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because it is hard to imagine how one could completely lose the ability to perceive touch – 
although one may very well experience a loss of sensibility in certain body parts (for the rare 
case of congenital insensitivity to pain see the respective section of Study 3). In this context, 
one may consider the degree of disability assigned to the loss of different parts of one’s 
extremities, keeping in mind that the loss of a body part is certainly different from merely 
losing sensibility in one of these body parts. That being said, the German Insurance Foun-
dation assigns a degree of disability of 70% to the loss of an arm or a leg, 40% to the loss of 
a foot, 20% to the loss of the thumb, 10% to the loss of the index finger, and 5% to the loss 
of any other finger. According to these numbers, no loss is worse than the loss of sight in 
both eyes. Thus, all in all, the regulations published by the German Insurance Foundation 
confirm the observations reported above: Vision seems to be the dominant sense – both in 
research and in public perception. 
The question is: Why? Why is there so much more research on vision than on any 
other sensory modality – although we permanently make perceptual experiences with all our 
senses? At first, one may think that this question is relatively easy (and may even be trivial) 
to answer: Is vision not simply our most important sense, is it not the sense that we would 
miss the most if we lost it? If so, the bias towards vision in research would mirror the natural 
importance of vision in our daily lives. Although there may be arguments in favor of this 
straightforward explanation, one should not forget that research agendas are not necessarily 
driven by rational reasons, but often rather depend on idiosyncratic circumstances (see, e.g., 
Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962). Thus, it does not only seem to be legitimate, but advisable, 
to look for reasons beyond the idea of the natural importance that can help explain the bias 
towards vision in research. This is done in Study 3. In case it should turn out that at least the 
degree to which vision dominates research on perception and perceptual long-term memory 
cannot solely be explained by pointing to its natural importance, this would open up a space 
for reflecting upon the relevance of the other senses and about the way future research agen-
das should be designed. 
 
1.4 Study Overview and Summary of the Research Questions 
Study 1 investigated the quantity and quality of information stored in haptic-long term 
memory. Study 1 was divided into two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants haptically 
explored 168 everyday objects for ten seconds per object. Participants were asked to remem-
ber the objects for a later memory test. Half of the objects were tested immediately after 
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exploration, the other half one week later. In order to show that detailed memory represen-
tations were stored, memory for the objects was tested with a 2AFC in which participants 
had to indicate which of two objects from the same basic-level category (e.g., two different 
sports shoes, two different hammers) they had explored before. Participants were blindfolded 
during exploration and test. Experiment 2 used the same basic design with four crucial 
changes. First, encoding was incidental, that is, participants did not know that their memory 
for the explored objects would be tested later. Second, half of the haptically explored objects 
were tested in a crossmodal visual test. Third, participants were asked to provide 
metamemory judgments at test. Fourth, memory for all objects was tested after one week. 
Again, participants were blindfolded during exploration and during the unimodal haptic test. 
Participants were not allowed to touch the objects during the crossmodal visual test. 
 Study 2 was designed to challenge the assumption that no information is stored in 
long-term memory when the attentional resources are fully exhausted by a concurrent task 
and to test whether detailed memory representations are stored in perceptual long-term 
memory for auditory information. While viewing a rapid visual stream of words and reacting 
to direct word repetitions, participants were simultaneously presented with an auditory 
stream consisting of everyday sounds. Participants were told that the sounds were irrelevant 
and that they should try to avoid distraction by the sounds as much as possible. Memory for 
the unattended, irrelevant, and incidentally encoded sounds was tested in a surprise memory 
test. Memory was tested using a 2AFC. Participants had to choose between two sounds from 
the same basic-level category (e.g., the humming of two different refrigerators). Half of the 
sounds was tested in an immediate test; the other half was tested one day later. Above-chance 
performance would indicate that detailed information was stored in auditory perceptual long-
term memory, even though the attentional demands were high and participants were fully 
distracted by stimulation in a different sensory modality. 
 Although the first two studies of this thesis are concerned with haptic and auditory 
long-term memory respectively, most research on perceptual long-term memory is research 
on visual long-term memory. Study 3 investigated the reasons behind this apparent domi-
nance of the visual. Intuitively, one may think that the dominance of the visual is easy to 
explain: Researchers and lay people alike seem to be convinced that vision is not only the 
most important, but also the most complex of our senses. Thus, the dominance of the visual 
would merely mirror the functioning of human brains and bodies. Before accepting this con-
clusion, however, one should take a closer look at the claim that vision is our most important 
and most complex sensory modality. Study 3 does so by analyzing different definitions of 
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the terms ‘importance’ and ‘complexity’. In addition, one should also look for alternative 
explanations that can help understand the dominance of the visual. This is done by investi-
gating possible methodological, structural, and cultural mechanisms maintaining and sup-
porting the bias towards vision. In case it should turn out that the dominance of the visual is 
not simply a law of nature, but influenced by human-decision making, one could start think-
ing about whether the degree to which vision dominates research on the senses is actually 
desirable.  
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2. Peer-Reviewed Studies 
2.1 Study 1 – Long-Term Memory for Haptically Explored Objects: Fidelity, Durabil-
ity, Incidental Encoding, and Cross-Modal Transfer 
 
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced version of an article published 2018 in Psychological Science 
following peer review. The official citation that should be used in referencing this material is Hutmacher, F. & 
Kuhbandner, C. (2018). Long-Term Memory for Haptically Explored Objects: Fidelity, Durability, Incidental 
Encoding, and Cross-Modal Transfer. Psychological Science, 29, 2031-2038. Copyright © 2018 The Au-
thor(s). doi: 10.1177/0956797618803644  
 
Abstract 
The question of how many of our perceptual experiences are stored in long-term memory 
has received considerable attention. The present study examined long-term memory for hap-
tic experiences. Blindfolded participants haptically explored 168 everyday objects (e.g., a 
pen) for ten seconds each. In a blindfolded memory test, they indicated which of two objects 
from the same basic-level category (e.g., two different pens) had been touched before. As 
shown in Experiment 1 (N = 26), memory was nearly perfect when tested immediately after 
exploration (94%) and still high when tested after one week (85%). As shown in Experiment 
2 (N = 43), when participants explored the objects without the intention to memorize them, 
memory in a one-week delayed surprise test was still high (79%), even when assessed with 
a cross-modal visual memory test (73%). These results indicate that detailed, durable long-
term memory representations are stored as a natural product of haptic perception. 
Keywords: haptic memory, perceptual memory, cross-modal memory, object memory, 
memory capacity
22 
 
Long-Term Memory for Haptically Explored Objects: Fidelity, Durability, Incidental 
Encoding, and Cross-Modal Transfer 
Imagine you are strolling around in a shopping mall on a lazy day, detecting a large rummage 
table with hundreds of different objects. Just for fun, you explore the objects, often even not 
looking at the objects your hands are touching. One week later, someone surprisingly asks 
you about your memories for the objects you have touched without looking at them. Would 
you remember the haptic experiences you have made while touching the objects? If so, how 
detailed would your haptic memories be? And if your haptic memories were detailed, would 
you even be able to visually recognize these objects although you have never seen them 
before? The aim of the present study was to examine these questions. 
The question of how many of the thousands of perceptual experiences we make dur-
ing a day are stored in long-term memory has received considerable attention. At first glance, 
one may assume that it is unlikely that the majority of perceptual experiences are stored in 
long-term memory. First, an overwhelming amount of information would have to be stored, 
and second, this seems not functional, especially if there is no intention to remember the 
perceptual experience. However, intriguing findings in the domain of visual long-term 
memory indicate that humans indeed store an extraordinary large number of perceptual ex-
periences. First evidence comes from landmark studies in the 1970s, demonstrating that after 
viewing 10,000 real-world photographs for only 5 sec each across five consecutive days, 
observers could determine which of two photographs had been presented with a remarkably 
high accuracy of 83% (Standing, 1973). Even more surprising, more recent studies have 
shown that the stored long-term memory representations consist not only of the “gist” of the 
photographs. Rather, observers could successfully determine which of two photographs had 
been presented with high accuracy even when the photographs differed only in subtle details 
(Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010; Vogt & 
Magnussen, 2007), suggesting that high-fidelity representations are stored. Finally, it has 
been shown that visual experiences are even stored when there is no intention to memorize 
them (Castelhano & Henderson, 2005; Kuhbandner, Rosas-Corona, & Spachtholz; 2017; 
Williams, Henderson, & Zacks, 2005), indicating that long-term memory representations are 
formed as a natural product of visual perception. In view of these findings, it has been con-
cluded that the storage capacity of human long-term memory is much more massive than 
commonly believed (Brady et al., 2008). 
However, when making an experience in real life, the experience is typically not 
restricted to the visual modality, but involves other sensory modalities as well. For instance, 
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when exploring an object, several non-visual sensations have to be extracted and integrated, 
such as texture, hardness, and weight (e.g., Martinovic, Lawson, & Craddock, 2012). Criti-
cally, whereas much research has focused on long-term memory for visually explored ob-
jects, relatively little is known about long-term memory for experiences in other sensory 
modalities. With regard to storage capacity, if object experiences in other sensory modalities 
are stored in similar quantity and quality in long-term memory as experiences in the visual 
modality, then the capacity of long-term memory would be even larger than estimated based 
on the abilities of visual long-term memory alone.  
The main aim of the present study was to measure the ability to store haptic experi-
ences in long-term memory. Previous research has already shown that objects can generally 
be identified through haptic exploration alone (Klatzky, Lederman, & Metzger, 1985), and 
that haptically explored objects can indeed be recognized above chance after a delay of up 
to one week (e.g., Pensky, Johnson, Haag, & Homa, 2008; for a review, see Gadelha et al., 
2013). However, little is known about the true memory abilities of the haptic long-term 
memory system. In all of the previous studies on memory for haptically explored objects, 
memory tests have been used that heavily relied on recollective experience (i.e., single item 
old/new recognition tests) and may thus not have been sensitive enough to reveal the actual 
amount of information stored in haptic long-term memory (Cunningham, Yassa, & Egeth, 
2015; Guerin, Robbins, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2012). 
Beyond measuring the quantity and fidelity of long-term memory representations for 
haptically explored objects, a second aim of the present study was to examine whether ob-
jects that have been perceived in one sensory modality can be recognized in a memory test 
in another sensory modality (i.e., cross-modal object recognition). Previous research has 
shown that cross-modal object recognition is indeed possible above chance (e.g., Bushnell 
& Baxt, 1999), even when memory is tested after a delay of one week (Pensky et al., 2008). 
However, to our knowledge, all existing studies on cross-modal recognition have used less 
sensitive memory tests (single item old/new recognition tests). Hence, the true quantity and 
fidelity of cross-modal object recognition is still unknown. 
To measure the quantity of haptic experiences that is stored in long-term memory 
and the fidelity of these memory representations, in Experiment 1, we adopted the visual-
memory paradigm used by Brady and colleagues (2008; for an illustration, see Fig. 1a). Par-
ticipants were blindfolded and haptically explored 168 different everyday objects for 10 sec-
onds each for a later memory test. To measure memory for the objects, a blindfolded haptic 
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recognition test was used where two objects were given to participants, one previously ex-
plored old object, and one new foil object (two-alternative forced-choice test). The two ob-
jects belonged to the same basic-level category and differed only in subtle haptic details (for 
examples, see Fig. 1a). To measure the durability of the stored representations, half of the 
objects were tested immediately after the study phase, the other half was tested after one 
week. 
In Experiment 2, we made three modifications. First, to rule out the possibility that 
the results of Experiment 1 were attributable to intentional memorization strategies beyond 
haptic exploration (e.g., storing haptic information as verbal descriptions), an incidental en-
coding task was used. Participants were asked to explore the same 168 everyday objects with 
the aim of making aesthetic judgments, without mentioning that their memory for the objects 
would be tested later. Memory for the objects was tested in a surprise memory test after one 
week. If memory performance is still high, then also haptic experiences are stored as a nat-
ural product of haptic perception, similar to visual experiences. Second, to examine cross-
modal transfer, in the surprise memory test, half of the objects were tested in a blindfolded 
haptic recognition test (unimodal recognition) whereas the other half were tested in a visual 
recognition test (cross-modal recognition). Third, to examine whether the participants’ 
memory responses were guided by experiences of recollection (remembering episodic de-
tails) or familiarity (feeling of knowing), they were asked to provide metamemory judgments 
(remember vs. know vs. guess) for each of their responses. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Following previous work in the domain of visual long-term memory with sam-
ple sizes between 14 (Brady et al., 2008) and 24 (Vogt & Magnussen, 2007), we decided to 
collect data from at least 24 participants and continue data collection until the end of a se-
mester. In total, we recruited 26 undergraduate students (15 females, MAge = 23.85 years, SD 
= 3.99) who participated for course credit. All provided written informed consent, and all 
data exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study are reported. 
Materials. The stimulus set consisted of 168 pairs of categorically distinct everyday objects. 
Each pair of objects consisted of two exemplars that belonged to the same basic-level cate-
gory and differed only in haptic details. Although the two exemplars had to be haptically 
distinguishable, effort was made to keep the differences between them as small as possible 
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(for examples, see Figure 1a; for a list of all objects, see Table S1 in the Supplemental Ma-
terial available online; images of the stimuli can be downloaded at 
https://osf.io/p3bgz/?view_only=91e864a919df4d8da6a8a5dffe2158bc).  
Design and Procedure. After being blindfolded, participants haptically explored one of two 
exemplars of all 168 object pairs; the assignment of the exemplars of an object pair to the 
study phase was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to remem-
ber the objects for a later memory test, and to pay attention to object details such as texture, 
shape, and weight. Each object was presented for 10 seconds, followed by the presentation 
of the next object. The presentation of all objects took about one hour; presentation order 
was random. There was a 5-minute break after exploration of half of the objects. 
Memory for half of the objects was tested in an immediate test five minutes after the 
presentation of the last object; the other half was tested in a delayed memory test one week 
later. The assignment of objects to the immediate and delayed tests was counterbalanced 
across participants. In both memory tests, after being blindfolded again, participants were 
presented the previously explored exemplar together with the corresponding exemplar that 
had not been presented. Participants were instructed to indicate the object that had been ex-
plored before. Presentation order was random, and participants proceeded at their own pace.  
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Figure 1. Memory paradigm and recognition performance. The procedure of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 is illustrated in (a). In an initial encoding phase, blindfolded participants hap-
tically explored 168 everyday objects for 10 seconds each. Subsequently, memory was tested 
using a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test with foil objects that belonged to the 
same basic-level category and differed only in haptic details. In Experiment 1, participants 
intentionally memorized the objects, and memory for the objects was tested in a blindfolded 
haptic recognition test either immediately afterwards or after one week. In Experiment 2, 
participants encoded the objects without the intention to memorize them, and memory for 
the objects was tested after one week in either a unimodal haptic or a cross-modal visual 
recognition test. The results of Experiment 1 are depicted in (b). The box plots show partic-
ipants’ memory performance in the immediate and the delayed tests after one week. The 
results of Experiment 2 are depicted in (c). The box plots show participants’ memory per-
formance after one week in the unimodal haptic and the cross-modal visual recognition test. 
Center lines show the medians. Box limits indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles. Whiskers 
extend 1.5 times the interquartile range from the 25th and 75th percentiles. Data points are 
plotted as open circles. The dashed lines indicate chance performance. 
 
Results 
Memory performance in the immediate and 1-week delayed memory tests is shown in Figure 
1b. In the immediate memory test, nearly perfect object memory was observed, with partic-
ipants correctly reporting the previously explored exemplar on 94.4% of the trials (SD = 4.3, 
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95% CI [92.7%, 96.0%]). Even more intriguing, the results for the delayed memory test 
showed that memory performance was still remarkably high after a delay of one week. Par-
ticipants correctly reported the previously explored exemplar on 84.6% of the trials (SD = 
8.6, 95% CI [81.3%, 87.9%]), with relatively little forgetting across the delay of one week 
(MDifference = 9.8%, SD = 6.9, 95% CI [7.0%, 12.6%]), t(25) = 7.18, p < .001, d= 1.44, 95% 
CI [0.87, 1.99].  
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. In order to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 with a larger 
sample, 48 undergraduate students participated for course credit. Five of them were excluded 
from the analysis because they had expected a test according to the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire (see below; three expected a memory test, two expected an aesthetic judgment task 
on the same objects), resulting in a sample of 43 participants (39 females, MAge = 20.26 
years, SD = 2.23).1 All participants provided written informed consent, and all data exclu-
sions, manipulations, and measures in the study are reported. Experiment 2 was preregistered 
(see https://osf.io/p3bgz/?view_only=91e864a919df4d8da6a8a5dffe2158bc). 
Material, Design, and Procedure. The stimulus set was the same as in Experiment 1. The 
procedure was largely similar to Experiment 1 with two exceptions. As in Experiment 1, 
after being blindfolded, participants haptically explored one of two exemplars of all 168 
object pairs for 10 seconds each. However, instead of instructing participants to intentionally 
memorize the objects for a later memory test, an incidental encoding instruction was used. 
Participants were told that the aim of the study was to collect aesthetic judgments for every-
day objects, and they were asked to rate the pleasantness of each object on a seven-point 
Likert scale directly after having explored it (1 = “very unpleasant”, 7 = “very pleasant”). 
To assure that the participants explored the objects thoroughly, they were told that aesthetic 
judgments may depend on small details, and that they should hence pay attention to the 
objects’ texture, shape, and weight. The necessity of a second session after one week was 
explained by claiming that the stimulus set consisted of too many objects to present all of 
them during one session. To ensure that encoding was indeed incidental, after completion of 
the surprise memory test in the second session after one week, participants were asked 
whether they had expected that their object memory would be tested. 
After one week, memory for the objects was tested in a surprise memory test. Half 
of the initially explored objects were tested using the same blindfolded haptic two-alternative 
28 
 
forced-choice recognition test as in Experiment 1 (unimodal recognition test). The other half 
of the objects were tested in a visual two-alternative forced-choice recognition test (cross-
modal recognition test). The visual recognition test was similar to the haptic recognition test 
with the only difference that the two exemplars of an object pair were put on a table in front 
of the participants with the instruction to visually indicate which of the two exemplars they 
had previously explored without touching the objects. The assignment of objects to the visual 
and haptic recognition tests was counterbalanced across participants. To additionally exam-
ine whether the participants’ memory responses were guided by experiences of recollection 
or familiarity, they were asked to provide metamemory judgements. For each response in 
the recognition tests, participants were asked to indicate whether they remembered having 
touched the chosen object (recollection), whether they had a vague feeling of knowing the 
chosen object (familiarity), or whether they had purely guessed.  
 
Results 
Memory Performance. Memory performances in the unimodal haptic recognition test and 
the cross-modal visual recognition test are shown in Figure 1c. Memory performance was 
remarkably high in both the unimodal haptic and the cross-modal visual test. In the haptic 
test, participants correctly reported the previously explored exemplar on 79.2% of the trials 
(SD = 6.4, 95% CI [77.2, 81.2]). In the visual test, participants correctly reported the previ-
ously explored exemplar on 73.3% of the trials (SD =7.3, 95% CI [71.1, 75.6]). Performance 
in the unimodal haptic test was better than in the cross-modal visual test (MDifference = 5.9%, 
SD = 6.9, 95% CI [3.8, 8.0]), t(42) = 5.58, p < .001, d = 0.86, 95% CI [0.50, 1.20]. 
Metamemory Judgments. We first determined the frequency of the three types of 
metamemory judgments. Figure 2a shows the percentages of memory responses rated as 
remembered, known, or guessed, depending on the type of recognition test. In the unimodal 
haptic recognition test, for one third of their responses, participants claimed to have remem-
bered the chosen object (M = 33.6%, SD = 14.2, 95% CI [29.2, 38.0]), for one third they 
claimed to have a feeling of knowing the chosen object (M = 33.6%, SD = 10.9, 95% CI 
[30.2, 36.9]), and for one third they claimed to have guessed (M = 32.8%, SD = 15.6, 95% 
CI [28.0, 37.6]). In the cross-modal visual recognition test, the frequency of remember judg-
ments decreased (M = 25.3%, SD = 15.3, 95% CI [20.6, 30.0]), t(42) = -5.39, p < .001, d = 
0.56, 95% CI [0.32, 0.80], and the frequency of guess judgments increased (M = 41.5%, SD 
= 16.3) , 95% CI [36.5, 46.5]), t(42) = 6.29, p < .001, d = 0.54, 95% CI [0.34, 0.75], with no 
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significant change in the frequency of know judgments (M = 33.2%, SD = 11.9, 95% CI 
[29.5, 36.9]), t(42) = 0.35, p = .725, d = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.15]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Metamemory Judgments in Experiment 2. The percentages of memory re-
sponses rated as remembered, known, or guessed in the unimodal haptic (left panel) and the 
cross-modal visual recognition test (right panel) is shown in (a). The percentages of correct 
memory responses for each metamemory judgment in the unimodal haptic (left panel) and 
the cross-modal visual recognition test (right panel) is shown in (b). Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Next, we determined the quality of the provided metamemory judgements. Figure 2b depicts 
the percentages of correct memory responses for each metamemory judgment depending on 
the type of recognition test. In the unimodal haptic recognition test, the observed accuracy 
was highest for memory responses judged as remembered (M = 93.5%, SD = 5.2, 95% CI 
[91.9, 95.1), medium for memory responses judged as known (M = 78.3%, SD = 9.2, 95% 
CI [75.4, 81.2]), and lowest for memory responses judged as guessed (M = 65.6%; SD = 
12.4; 95% CI [61.8, 69.4]), tRemember-Know(41) = 10.91, p < .001, d = 2.04, 95% CI [1.46, 
2.60], tRemember-Guess(42) = 16.01, p < .001, d = 2.95, 95% CI [2.22, 3.67], and tKnow-Guess(41) 
= 5.91, p < .001, d = 1.16, 95% CI [0.70, 1.62]). In the cross-modal visual recognition test, 
a similar pattern was observed. Observed accuracy was highest for memory responses judged 
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as remembered (M = 89.0%, SD = 10.7, 95% CI [85.7, 92.3]), medium for memory responses 
judged as known (M = 74.5%, SD = 12.4, 95% CI [70.6, 78.3]), and lowest for memory 
responses judged as guessed (M = 63.2%; SD = 11.5; 95% CI [59.7, 66.7]), tRemember-Know(41) 
= 7.43, p < .001, d = 1.27, 95% CI [0.83, 1.70], tRemember-Guess(42) = 11.89, p < .001, d = 2.32, 
95% CI [1.69, 2.94], and tKnow-Guess(41) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 0.94, 95% CI [0.49, 1.38]). An 
analysis of variance with the factors of metamemory judgment (remember vs. know vs. 
guess) and type of recognition test (unimodal haptic vs. cross-modal visual) revealed no 
significant interaction, F(2, 82) = 0.26, p = .771, ηp2 = .01. Comparing the percentages of 
correct responses for memory responses judged as guessed with chance performance (50%) 
revealed that memory performance was far above chance, both in the unimodal haptic recog-
nition test, t(42) = 8.26, p < .001, d = 1.78, 95% CI [1.21, 2.34], and the cross-modal visual 
recognition test, t(42) = 7.53, p < .001, d = 1.62, 95% CI [1.07, 2.16]. 
 
Discussion 
What is stored in long-term memory from current perceptions is a question that has attracted 
considerable interest. The present study reveals that humans form detailed and durable long-
term memory representations for a high number of their haptic experiences, even if there is 
no intention to memorize them. As shown in Experiment 1, after exploring 168 everyday 
objects for 10 seconds each, participants showed high performance rates in a recognition 
memory test that required participants to distinguish between the previously explored object 
and a highly similar foil object. When memory was tested immediately afterwards, 94% of 
the previously explored objects were correctly identified; when memory was tested for the 
first time after one week, still 85% were correctly identified. As shown in Experiment 2, 
when participants haptically explored the objects without the intention to memorize them, 
performance in a surprise memory test after one week was still high (79%), indicating that 
detailed and durable long-term memory representations for haptically explored objects are 
stored as a natural product of haptic perception. 
Beyond demonstrating that a large number of haptic experiences is stored in long-
term memory, the present study reveals another interesting finding. As shown in Experiment 
2, although the participants had explored the objects solely haptically and never seen before, 
they were able to correctly identify the objects in a one-week delayed visual recognition test 
with almost the same accuracy as in the haptic recognition test (73% vs. 79%). This is even 
more remarkable as the old and foil objects in the recognition test belonged to the same 
basic-level category and were only distinguishable based on the haptic experiences made 
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during initial exploration. In particular, as an incidental encoding instruction was used, such 
a finding cannot be explained by intentional memorization strategies. There are two main 
possible explanations for this observation. First, it may be that haptic long-term memory 
representations are strategically retrieved at the time of the visual recognition test in order 
to distinguish between the elicited visual object representations. Second, it may be that visual 
object representations are automatically co-activated and stored when haptically exploring 
objects. Interestingly, the latter hypothesis is supported by evidence from brain-imaging 
studies, showing that cortical areas involved in visual processing seem to be activated during 
haptic processing as well (e.g., Snow, Strother, & Humphreys, 2014; for a review, see Lacey 
& Sathian, 2014). However, to clarify the exact mechanism underlying cross-modal object 
recognition, further research is needed. 
The metamemory judgments revealed that the participants’ actual memory perfor-
mance was only partially accompanied by corresponding conscious metamemory experi-
ences. Whereas most of the memory responses accompanied by the experience of recollec-
tion (remember judgment) were indeed correct, only about three out of four memory re-
sponses accompanied by the experience of familiarity (remember judgment) were correct. 
Furthermore, when a response in the memory test was not accompanied by an introspective 
metamemory experience (guess judgment), memory performance was still far above chance 
levels. Such a finding is in line with recent findings demonstrating the phenomenon of recog-
nition without awareness in verbal (Craik, Rose, & Gopie, 2015) and visual memory 
(Kuhbandner et al., 2017; Voss, Baym & Paller, 2008), supporting speculations that there 
may be a perceptual long-term memory system that operates below conscious awareness 
(e.g., Johnson, 1983; for a review, see Higgins & Johnson, 2012). However, such an inter-
pretation has to be treated with caution because a guess judgment may not necessarily signal 
unconscious memory but rather low confidence, a possibility that should be examined in 
future research. 
The present findings parallel recent findings in the domain of visual memory. As 
shown in several studies, humans store also a large amount of high-fidelity representations 
of visually explored objects in long-term memory way (e.g., Brady et al., 2008; Konkle et 
al., 2010; Vogt & Magnussen, 2007) with similar durability (Andermane & Bowers, 2015) 
and also under incidental encoding conditions (e.g., Castelhano & Henderson, 2005; 
Kuhbandner et al., 2017). It has been conjectured that these findings in the visual domain 
challenge existing cognitive and neural models of memory storage and retrieval, which must 
32 
 
be able to account for the large amount of stored information (Brady et al., 2008). The pre-
sent findings suggest that this challenge may even be greater than initially believed because 
humans seem to store high-fidelity representations not only of visually but also of haptically 
explored objects for a relatively long period of time as a natural product of perception.  
 
Footnotes 
1 We accidentally omitted this exclusion rule from our preregistration. However, as our aim 
was to examine incidental learning, excluding participants who had expected a memory test 
is inevitable. Including these participants revealed exactly the same results (MUnimodal = 
79.1%, SD = 6.1; MCross-Modal = 73.2%, SD = 7.5). 
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2.2 Study 2 – Detailed Long-Term Memory for Unattended, Irrelevant, and Inci-
dentally Encoded Auditory Information 
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Abstract 
At any moment, a myriad of information reaches our senses, of which only a small fraction 
is attentively processed. A long held believe is that unattended information is only weakly 
processed if attentional demands are high and the unattended information is irrelevant, leav-
ing no recognizable trace in long-term memory. The present study challenges this assump-
tion. Participants (N = 51) were simultaneously presented with a rapid visual stream of words 
and an auditory stream of everyday sounds, with the instruction to attend to the visual stream 
and detect word repetitions, and to avoid distraction by the irrelevant sounds. No mention 
was made that their memory would be tested later. Memory for the sounds was tested in a 
surprise two-alternative forced choice recognition test with similar foil sounds. Half of the 
sounds were tested immediately after encoding, the other half after a delay of 24 hours. 
Memory performance was substantially above chance in both the immediate and the 24-
hours delayed test, without significant forgetting across time. These results demonstrate that 
detailed and durable long-term memory representations are formed for unattended and irrel-
evant information that is incidentally encoded in a different sensory modality than the at-
tended information.  
Keywords: perceptual long-term memory, auditory long-term memory, long-term memory 
capacity, attention, attentional load
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Detailed Long-Term Memory for Unattended, Irrelevant, and Incidentally Encoded 
Auditory Information 
Imagine you are sitting in a café, engaged in a conversation with a friend that fully captures 
your attention. At the table behind you, somebody fills a glass with water from a bottle, 
producing a sound that reaches your auditory senses but is not noticed by you. One day later, 
somebody unexpectedly asks you about your memory for the perceptual details of the sound. 
Would you be able to recognize the perceptual details despite not having noticed the sound 
the day before? The aim of the present study was to examine this question. 
At any moment, a vast amount of information reaches our senses, of which only a small 
fraction is relevant for our current goals. In order to behave in a functional way, our cognitive 
system needs to attend to the relevant fraction of the incoming information. Furthermore, 
since capacity is limited at several stages of the processing hierarchy (e.g., Cowan, 2001; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997), processing at these limited-capacity stages should be focused on the 
attended information as well. Thus, it seems to be a natural necessity of functional behavior 
that only a part of the incoming information is attended and processed in an enhanced way, 
an assumption that is supported by an abundance of empirical findings (for a review, see 
Serences & Kastner, 2014). 
However, while the enhanced processing of attended information seems to be a set-
tled fact, the fate of the unattended information is still debated, although this has received 
considerable research attention for several decades (for reviews, see, e.g., Driver, 2001; 
Lavie, 2006). Initially, at the heart of the debate was the question at which stage of the pro-
cessing hierarchy unattended information is filtered out. According to early selection ac-
counts (Broadbent, 1958), unattended information is initially represented in the form of low-
level feature representations but does not reach subsequent processing stages where feature 
representations are integrated into coherent objects and represented in semantically mean-
ingful ways. In contrast, according to late selection accounts (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963), 
both attended and unattended information is processed in parallel up to the levels of object 
perception and semantic description. Attention operates after completion of these processing 
stages, selecting a subset of the processed items that is further processed in working memory 
and consciously perceived, filtering out processed items that are not selected. 
As empirical findings did not reveal a clear picture in favor for either early or late 
selection, more flexible models have been suggested. For instance, according to attentional-
load accounts (Lavie, 1995; 2010), the stage at which unattended information is filtered out 
varies as a function of the demands that are imposed by a task on perceptual capacity. If a 
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task imposes high demands that exceed capacity limits, only task-relevant items are pro-
cessed so that early selection occurs. If a task imposes only low demands, the remaining 
capacity spills over to task-irrelevant items that are then processed at higher levels as well. 
Taken together, the existing findings are best interpreted in terms of a flexible multi-level 
account, suggesting that unattended stimuli are filtered out at different stages in the pro-
cessing hierarchy, depending on the specific demands of a task (e.g., Serences & Kastner, 
2014).  
One common assumption that is shared by all of the mentioned accounts is that un-
attended information is filtered out somewhere during the processing hierarchy, at least if 
the attentional demands of a task are high enough, suggesting that unattended information 
does not reach the stage of long-term memory storage. In fact, such an assumption was ini-
tially supported by numerous empirical studies showing that unattended information is not 
consciously remembered (e.g., Glucksberg & Cowen, 1970; Norman, 1969; Peterson, 1964). 
However, in the course of the discovery of the phenomenon of the existence of unconscious 
implicit memory, this view has been challenged. Using tasks such as word-fragment com-
pletion or perceptual identification, it has been shown that past experiences can affect current 
thoughts and behaviors without any awareness that one is influenced by memories of past 
experiences (e.g., Schacter, 1987; for a review see Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993). In 
particular, such effects have been shown to occur even after very long retention intervals of 
several days (Musen & Treisman, 1990), months (Mitchell & Brown, 1988), or even years 
(Mitchell, 2006). 
Thus, since conscious awareness seems not to be a necessary precondition of 
memory, it may be that even unattended information that does not reach the stage of con-
scious perception during initial encoding is stored in long-term memory. In fact, such an 
assumption seems to be supported by a number of studies showing that dividing attention 
during encoding does substantially reduce performance on explicit memory tests that require 
conscious recollection of previous experiences (e.g., free or cued recall) but not on implicit 
memory tests that do not rely on conscious recollection (e.g., Mulligan, 1998), suggesting 
that the withdrawal of attention during initial encoding does not decrease subsequent implicit 
memories. In particular, as shown in more recent studies, withdrawing attention from to-be-
studied items seems sometimes even to enhance the ability to perceptually identify the items 
later (Voss, Baym, & Paller, 2008). 
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However, there are two problems with the mentioned studies in the domain of im-
plicit memory that make it difficult to draw conclusions about the fate of unattended infor-
mation. First, although the studied items were “unattended” in the sense of withdrawal of 
attention by a concurrently performed task, the “unattended” items were still relevant stimuli 
for the participants because no incidental encoding instructions were used. Second, although 
relatively attention-demanding secondary tasks were used (e.g., concurrently monitoring up 
to seven digits; Mulligan, 1998), it may be that perceptual capacity was not fully exhausted 
by the secondary task so that attentional resources may have spilled over to the to-be-studied 
items, which seems to be likely as these items were not deemed as irrelevant. 
In fact, several subsequent studies have consistently demonstrated that observers 
show a null memory effect for unattended stimuli in a subsequent old-new recognition 
(ONR) test, when incidental encoding instructions are used in combination with a high at-
tentional load task (i.e., monitoring of a rapid continuous presentation of to-be-attended stim-
uli; Butler & Klein, 2009; Hoffman, Bein, & Maril, 2011; Lavie, Lin, Zokaei, & Thoma, 
2009; Rees, Russell, Frith, & Driver, 1999; Ruz, Wolmetz, Tudela, & McCandliss, 2005; 
Ruz, Worden, Tudela, & McCandliss, 2005). Thus, it seems that unattended irrelevant infor-
mation is not stored in long-term memory when the attentional load of the attended task is 
high enough. 
However, this has been challenged by a number of recent studies in which the same 
high attentional load task was used as in the previous studies, but in which memory was 
assessed with more sensitive memory tests (Butler & Klein, 2009; Hoffman, Bein, & Maril, 
2011). The most striking evidence comes from a recent study by Kuhbandner, Rosas-Corona, 
and Spachtholz (2017) where recognition was not measured with a recollection-dependent 
ONR as in the aforementioned studies, but with a two-alternative forced choice recognition 
test (2AFC) that relied on perceptual identification. Importantly, since a 2AFC test does 
measure memory only more sensitively than an ONR test if participants’ responses are not 
only based on experiences of recollection or familiarity, participants were encouraged to 
guess and go with their “gut feelings”; as shown in other research, by encouraging uncon-
sciously informed guessing, the amount of stored information is measured substantially more 
sensitively than when participants base their memory responses on experiences of recollec-
tion and familiarity (Voss & Paller, 2010). When dissimilar perceptual foils were used, 
memory performance (corrected for guessing) went up to a rate of 47.5%. Even more intri-
guingly, even when highly similar perceptual foils were used, memory performance was 
high (22.4%), indicating that high-fidelity representation of unattended stimuli had been 
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stored. Furthermore, even when incidental memory for the unattended stimuli was tested for 
the first time after 24 hours, memory performance was still far above chance (dissimilar 
foils: 20.5%, similar foils: 10.9%). 
Taken together, the latter studies demonstrate that humans store detailed representa-
tions of current sensory stimulations in long-term memory independently of current inten-
tions and the current attentional focus. However, one potential limitation of this astounding 
ability may be that this holds only for unattended information that is processed in the same 
sensory processing channel as the attended information. In all of the above mentioned stud-
ies, both the attended and unattended information were presented within the same sensory 
modality (visual) so that it remains to be shown whether detailed long-term memory repre-
sentations are also formed for unattended information processed in another sensory modality 
than the attended information. On the one hand, based on findings suggesting that different 
sensory modalities draw from separate resource reservoirs (e.g., Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 
1997; Soto-Faraco & Spence, 2002), one may speculate that unattended information pro-
cessed in other sensory modalities is stored in long-term memory with similar quality as 
well. On the other hand, based on findings suggesting that attention increases already the 
gain of responses from very early processing areas (e.g., Carrasco, 2009; O’Connor, Fukui, 
Pinsk, & Kastner, 2002), one may speculate that unattended information processed in other 
sensory modalities is stored in long-term memory with less quality. Preliminary evidence 
that at least some aspects of the unattended information processed in other sensory modali-
ties is stored in memory comes from a study showing that words that were acoustically pre-
sented while participants performed a visual high attentional load task were remembered 
slightly above chance in a subsequent word recognition test (Sinnett, Costa, & Soto-Faraco, 
2006). However, as participants were not instructed to ignore the acoustically presented 
words, it may still have been the case that attention spilled over to the auditory stream some-
times. Furthermore, as memory was tested only immediately after using a cross-modal 
recognition test where the words were presented in written form, both the durability and the 
quality of the stored representations is unknown.  
The aim of the present study was to examine whether detailed long-term memory 
representations are also formed for unattended information processed in another sensory 
modality than the attended information. To examine this question, participants were simul-
taneously presented with a rapid stream of visually presented words and an auditory stream 
of everyday sounds, with the instruction to attend to the words and to press a button every 
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time a word was repeated, and to avoid distraction by the irrelevant sounds as good as pos-
sible (for an illustration, see Fig. 1A). No mention was made that their memory for any 
stimuli would be tested later. Memory for the unattended and incidentally encoded sounds 
was tested immediately after encoding and after 24 hours. To test memory, a two-alternative 
forced choice recognition (2AFC) test was used with similar foils belonging to the same 
basic-level category so that a correct decision required the existence of stored detailed long-
term memory representations of the unattended sounds. 
 
Method 
Participants 
We decided to collect data from at least 41 participants based on the sample size in a similar 
study (Kuhbandner et al., 2017), and to continue data collection until the end of a semester. 
In total, 52 undergraduate students participated for course credit. The study was conducted 
in accordance with APA ethical standards in the treatment of participants; all participants 
provided written informed consent. One participant was excluded, because he had expected 
a memory test for the sounds according to the post-experimental questionnaire (see below), 
resulting in a sample of 51 participants (40 females, MAge = 23.00 years, SD = 5.40). All data 
exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study are reported. 
Materials 
The stimulus set consisted of 168 categorically distinct everyday sounds (e.g. the barking of 
a dog, the humming of a fridge, a starting motor, a glass being filled, a bird singing; sounds 
were taken from the IADS, Bradley & Lang, 1999, from a freely available online database, 
or self-created using a recording device; data and information about the stimuli can be down-
loaded at osf.io/3vgcu). For 72 of the 168 sounds, there was a second exemplar from the 
same basic-level category; these sound pairs were used in the 2AFC test. The differences 
between the two sounds of a pair were kept as small as possible while still being distinguish-
able. The other 96 sounds were filler items. The sound duration varied between one and five 
seconds, the length of the two sounds of a pair was identical. Volume normalization of the 
stimuli was performed using an open-source volume normalization software (Mp3Gain) 
based on the ReplayGain algorithm proposed by Robinson (2001) that estimates the per-
ceived loudness level of a sample and adjusts the sounds to a reference level. This reference 
level was set to 60dB SPL. The words for the word repetition task were taken from the Berlin 
Affective Word List (BAWL-R; Vo et al., 2009). In total, 660 neutral, five- to six-letter 
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German words were used (written in black and uppercase letters, valence from -1 to 1 on a 
scale from -3 to 3). The words were unrelated to the everyday sounds. 
Design and Procedure. The procedure of the experiment was based on the high attentional 
load paradigm introduced by Rees et al. (1999). Participants were simultaneously presented 
with a rapid visual stream of words and an auditory stream of everyday sounds (for an illus-
tration, see Fig. 1A). In the visual stream, the words were presented centered on a screen in 
black on a white background written in bold, capitalized letters in Calibri font at a size of 18 
points. Each word was randomly rotated 45° clockwise or counterclockwise and presented 
for 250 ms, followed by an interstimulus interval of 250 ms. On average once every five 
words a word was repeatedly shown; there were never two repetitions in a row. On repetition 
trials, the words were shown in different orientations. In the auditory stream, the sounds 
were presented to participants via headphones. Each sound was presented only once during 
this phase of the experiment. In order to exclude primacy and recency effects, the first and 
last fifteen sounds were filler items only. The remaining 138 sounds (72 target and 66 filler 
items) were presented in one of four pre-experimentally generated orders that were randomly 
determined each. The position of target and filler items in the pre-experimentally generated 
orders was random. The assignment of the exemplars of a sound pair to the incidental study 
phase was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were instructed to attend to the visual stream of words and to detect im-
mediate word repetitions by pressing a button, and to ignore the auditory stream of sounds 
as good as possible. To maximize the focusing of attention on the words and the irrelevance 
of the sounds, participants were told that the aim of the study was to measure the ability of 
avoiding distraction by irrelevant sounds. No mention was made that their memory for any 
of the stimuli would be tested later. Immediately after completing the word repetition task, 
the participants’ memory for half of the sounds was tested in a surprise recognition test. The 
other half was tested in a second delayed recognition test after 24 hours. The assignment of 
the sound pairs to the immediate and delayed recognition tests was counterbalanced across 
participants. In the recognition test, participants consecutively listened to the two sound ex-
emplars of a pair, and they were asked to indicate which of the two sounds had been pre-
sented before (2AFC). Participants were told that this task will not be easy as they had ig-
nored the sounds during the previous attentional task, and that they will probably have the 
feeling of not knowing the answer in many cases. They were also told that numerous previ-
ous studies have shown that participants can nevertheless perform remarkably well in such 
situations when they base their decisions on their intuition. Hence, the participants were 
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asked to follow their “gut feelings” when not knowing an answer. Participants were allowed 
to proceed at their own pace; if they were not sure about their decision, they could listen to 
the two sounds of a pair again as often as they wanted. On half of the recognition test trials, 
the previously presented sound was presented first, on the other half second. Presentation 
order of the tested sound pairs was random. In the delayed recognition test, after having 
tested the sounds that had not been tested the day before, the sounds that had been tested the 
day before were tested again. To ensure that the sounds had been incidentally encoded, after 
completion of the immediate recognition test, the participants were asked whether they had 
expected a memory test for the sounds. 
  
Figure 1. Memory paradigm and recognition performance. The procedure of the exper-
iment is illustrated in (A). In an initial encoding phase, participants were simultaneously 
presented with a rapid visual stream of words and an auditory stream of everyday sounds. 
They were asked to attend to the visual stream and to detect immediate word repetitions, 
avoiding distraction by the irrelevant sounds. No mention was made that memory for any 
stimuli would be tested later. Memory for half of the sounds was tested in a surprise recog-
nition test immediately afterwards, the other half was tested in a second recognition test after 
24 hours. A two-alternative forced choice recognition test was used with foils that were sim-
ilar to the sounds presented before. Recognition performance is depicted in (B). The box-
and-whisker plots show participants’ memory performance (percentage of correct responses) 
in the immediate memory test and in the memory test after 24 hours. Center horizontal lines 
show the medians. Box limits indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles. Whiskers extend 1.5 
times the interquartile range from the 25th and 75th percentiles. Data points are plotted as 
open circles.  
 
Results 
Word Repetition Task. Participants’ performance in the word repetition task was high (M 
= 70.01%, SD = 12.50%, 95% CI [66.58, 73.44]) and in the range of previous studies using 
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the same high attentional load task (e.g., Ruz, Wolmetz, et al., 2005; Ruz, Worden, et al., 
2005), indicating that they successfully focused their attention on the words.  
Memory Performance. Figure 1B shows the participants’ memory performance (percent-
age of correct responses) in the immediate and the 24-hours delayed recognition tests. In the 
immediate test, memory performance was far above chance, M = 56.86%, SD = 9.87, 95% 
CI [54.16, 59.57], t(50) = 4.97, p < .001, d = 0.70. In the 24-hours delayed test, memory 
performance for sounds that were tested for the first time was still far above chance, M = 
55.83%, SD = 9.58, 95% CI [53.20, 58.46], t(50) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 0.61. There was no 
significant forgetting observed across the delay of 24 hours, MDifference = 1.03%, SD = 11.81, 
95% CI [-2.21, 4.27], t(50) = 0.63, p = .534, d = 0.09. Memory performance in the delayed 
test for sounds that had already been tested in the immediate test was above chance as well, 
M = 54.19%, SD = 6.39, 95% CI [52.44, 55.95], t(50) = 4.69, p < .001, d = 0.66. Performance 
did not significantly differ between sounds that were tested for the first time after 24 hours 
and sounds that had already been tested in the immediate test, MDifference = 1.63%, SD = 11.51, 
95% CI [-1.52, 4.79], t(50) = 1.01, p = .316, d = 0.14. 
Additionally, we also calculated a sensitivity index d'FC corrected for response bias 
(for details, see Wickens, 2002, p. 101). The sensitivity index corrected for bias differed 
significantly from zero for both the immediate test, d'FC = 0.36, SD = 0.53, 95% CI [0.21, 
0.50], t(50) = 4.84, p < .001, d = 0.68, and the 24-hours delayed test, d'FC = 0.31, SD = 0.51, 
95% CI [0.17, 0.45], t(50) = 4.38, p < .001, d = 0.61. There was no significant decrease of 
d'FC across the delay of 24 hours, d'FC-Difference = 0.04, SD = 0.63, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.22], t(50) 
= 0.51, p = .612, d = 0.07. Memory performance in the delayed test for sounds that had 
already been tested in the immediate test was above chance as well, d'FC = 0.23, SD = 0.35, 
95% CI [0.13, 0.32], t(50) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 0.66. The sensitivity index did not signifi-
cantly differ between sounds that were tested for the first time after 24 hours and sounds that 
had already been tested in the immediate test, d'FC-Difference = 0.09, SD = 0.62, 95% CI [-0.09, 
0.26], t(50) = 0.99, p = .329, d = 0.14. 
To address the possibility that the observed memory performance for the sounds 
might be attributable to a covert allocating of attention to the sounds during encoding, a 
number of additional analyses were performed (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Results of the Additional Analyses. The distribution of the percentage of correct 
responses across the 72 sound pairs is depicted in (A). The relation between the participants’ 
performance in the word repetition task and the average percentage correct is depicted in 
(B). The box-and-whisker plots depicted in (C) show participants’ memory performance for 
sounds during whose presentation no word repetitions were detected (11.1% of sounds), 50% 
of the word repetitions were detected (24.9% of sounds), and all word repetitions were de-
tected (64.1% of sounds). Center horizontal lines show the medians. Box limits indicate the 
25th and 75th percentiles. Whiskers extend 1.5 times the interquartile range from the 25th 
and 75th percentiles. Data points are plotted as open circles. The percentage of correct re-
sponses was collapsed across the immediate test and the delayed test for sounds tested for 
the first time.  
 
To rule out that the observed memory performance was driven only by a few specific sounds 
that may automatically have attracted attention, we determined the average percentage cor-
rect for each sound pair across participants (collapsed across the immediate test and the de-
layed test for sounds tested for the first time; this was done for all of the following analyses). 
As shown in Figure 2A, performance was normally distributed across the sounds, W(72) = 
0.973 p = .125. To rule out that the observed memory performance was driven by a transient 
shift of attention away from the visual stream of words during encoding, two further analyses 
were performed. First, we correlated the participants’ performance in the word repetition 
task with their later memory performance. If the observed memory performance is attribut-
able to a switching of attention away from the word repetition task, a negative correlation 
should be observed. However, performance in the word repetition task and memory perfor-
mance were not significantly correlated, r = .15, p = .296 (see Figure 2B). Second, we com-
pared memory performance for sounds during whose presentation all word repetitions were 
detected (64.1% of the target sounds), only 50% of the word repetitions were detected 
(24.9% of the target sounds), and no word repetitions were detected (11.1% of the target 
sounds). Memory performance did not differ between the three types of sounds (MAll Detected 
= 57.15%, SD = 8.66, 95% CI [54.77, 59.53]; M50% Detected = 54.67%, SD = 21.72, 95% CI 
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[48.71, 60.63]; M0% Detected = 56.25%, SD = 16.30, 95% CI [51.78, 60.72]), F(2,100) = 0.355, 
p = .702, η²p = 0.007 (see Figure 2C). 
 
Discussion 
At any moment, a myriad of information reaches our senses, of which only a small fraction 
is attentively processed. Early on, it has been suggested that the unattended information is 
only weakly processed and partially analyzed, leaving no recognizable trace in memory 
(Broadbent, 1958), an assumption that is still believed to be true at least if the demands of 
the attended task are high and the unattended information is irrelevant for one’s current goals 
(Lavie, 2010), supported by numerous studies (e.g., Lavie et al. 2009; Rees et al., 1999; Ruz, 
Wolmetz, et al., 2005; Ruz, Worden, et al., 2005). By using a more sensitive recognition test 
(2AFC test) than in the previous studies (ONR test), the present results challenge this as-
sumption. Participants were able to recognize unattended and irrelevant auditory information 
that was incidentally encoded in a visual high attentional load task, even though a correct 
response required detailed knowledge about the auditory information, and even when 
memory was tested for the first time after a delay of 24 hours, without significant forgetting 
across time. These results corroborate previous findings in the visual domain (Butler & 
Klein, 2009; Kuhbandner et al., 2017) and extend them by showing that detailed and durable 
long-term memory representations are even formed for unattended information processed in 
a different sensory modality than the attended information.  
Together with the findings of Butler and Klein (2009) and Kuhbandner et al. (2017), 
the present study provides clear evidence that humans store detailed copies of current sen-
sory stimulations in long-term memory, independently of current intentions and the current 
attentional focus. In fact, based on findings in the domain of implicit memory, showing that 
past perceptual experiences can influence behavior without conscious awareness even after 
only a single observation and longer retention intervals (e.g., Musen & Treisman, 1990; 
Mitchell & Brown, 1988; Mitchell, 2006), it has been postulated that there is a perceptual 
representation memory system that operates independently of the episodic memory system 
(Schacter, 1990; for a similar account see Johnson, 1983). However, the operating charac-
teristics and representational format of such a potentially existing memory system have re-
mained relatively unclear to date (e.g., Butler & Berry, 2001). Regarding operating charac-
teristics, the present results indicate that the perceptual representation memory system oper-
ates independently of one’s current attentional focus and intentions. Regarding the represen-
tational format, the present results suggest that perceptual experiences are stored in detail. 
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In particular, since it is commonly assumed that attention is required for the binding of fea-
tures into coherent object representations (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980), it seems that the 
unattended information is stored in the form of independent feature representations. Indeed, 
such an assumption is supported by previous findings showing that low-level feature infor-
mation can be retained with high precision in long-term memory (e.g., Magnussen & Dyrnes, 
1994), and that the quality of object representations in perceptual long-term memory can be 
predicted from early preattentive brain activities (Spachtholz & Kuhbandner, 2017). In line 
with that and as far as the processing of auditory stimuli is concerned in particular, it has 
been demonstrated that participants are able to remember specific spectro-temporal peculi-
arities in noise stimuli (i.e., to remember specific, fine-grained features of the presented 
stimuli; Agus & Pressnitzer, 2013; Agus, Thorpe, & Pressnitzer, 2010).  
In the present study, similar pairs of sounds were used. As in numerous previous 
studies (e.g. Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008; Hutmacher & Kuhbandner, 2018), sim-
ilarity was defined as semantic similarity, that is, sounds were considered as similar when 
they belonged to the same basic-level category. For instance, participants had to differentiate 
between the humming sounds of two different fridges or the sound of filling two different 
glasses with water. From the perspective of memory, the consequence is that remembering 
a sound at the level of semantics was insufficient for a correct response. Rather, to reach a 
correct response, perceptual information about the initially presented sounds had to be stored 
and retrieved. Beyond semantics, the similarity of sounds can also be defined on the sensory-
perceptual level. However, previous research has shown that determining the sensory-per-
ceptual similarity of everyday environmental sounds is non-trivial for several reasons. First, 
everyday environmental sounds differ along many more dimensions than simple laboratory-
generated stimuli so that defining similarity for this kind of sounds becomes vastly more 
difficult (see e.g. Dickerson & Gaston, 2014). Second, complex auditory stimuli such as 
everyday environmental sounds seem to be more than simple linear combinations of single 
discrete properties. For instance, simply varying the position of a tone in a sequence or add-
ing a tone to the sequence affects discrimination performance dramatically, although the 
changes are quite small from a quantitative perspective (Watson, Wroton, Kelly, & Ben-
bassat, 1975). This means that even if all different stimulus dimensions can be quantified, it 
is difficult to see how these different dimensions could be integrated into a single similarity 
score that can be related to the participants’ perception (e.g., Susini, Lemaitre, & McAdams, 
2012). Hence, we decided to make the pairs of the used everyday environmental sounds 
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perceptually similar only by controlling for object-unrelated features such as length and vol-
ume of the sounds. Nevertheless, systematically exploring the influence of similarity at the 
sensory-perceptual level using optimized acoustic stimuli seems to be a promising topic for 
future research. 
In view of the percentages of correct responses observed in the immediate test 
(56.86%) and the 24-hours delayed memory test (55.83%), at first glance, the overall 
memory effect seems rather small given a guessing probability of 50%. However, first, it is 
important to note that the percentage of presented objects that were stored so that they were 
successfully discriminated from the foil objects in the test is not simply the difference be-
tween the observed percentage of correct responses and the guessing probability, but two 
times the difference (e.g., Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2013). Second, one has to take 
into account, that similar foils were used in the memory tests so that a correct response re-
quired that detailed memory representations were stored. Research in the visual domain has 
shown that performance is much better when less similar foils are used (Kuhbandner et al., 
2017), suggesting that representations of many more objects are stored but partly in less 
quality. Third, in view of previous studies that have used old-new recognition tests, suggest-
ing that memory for attended sounds is relatively poor (Cohen, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2009) 
and memory for unattended stimuli generally absent (e.g., Lavie et al., 2009; Rees et al., 
1999; Ruz, Wolmetz, et al., 2005; Ruz, Worden, et al., 2005), the finding that memory is 
significantly above chance when measured with a two-alternative forced choice test seems 
relatively surprising. 
In view of recent findings in the domain of visual memory, showing that observers 
can successfully recognize details of thousands of visual images after having studied them 
only for a few seconds each (e.g., Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008), it has been con-
jectured that existing cognitive and neural models of long-term memory storage and retrieval 
are challenged given the large amount of stored information (Brady et al., 2008). The finding 
that detailed representations are even formed for a significant fraction of the incoming unat-
tended, irrelevant, and incidentally encoded information suggests that this challenge may 
even be larger than initially believed.  
 
Context of the Research 
We are fascinated by the question of how many of the thousands of perceptual experiences 
we make every day are stored in long-term memory. Whereas earlier studies demonstrating 
phenomena such as change blindness (Simons & Rensink, 2005) or inattentional amnesia 
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(Wolfe, 1999) seemed to support the idea that long-term memory representations for percep-
tual experiences are rather sparse, more recent studies have shown that in fact detailed 
memory representations are stored. This does not only hold true for visual information (e.g., 
Brady et al., 2008; Kuhbandner et al., 2017), but also for haptic (Hutmacher & Kuhbandner, 
2018), and – as demonstrated in the present study – for auditory information. Building on 
these results, in future research, we want to explore the nature of these detailed memory 
representations. Preliminary evidence suggests that there are at least two options: storing 
information as independent features or as bound objects (e.g., Spachtholz & Kuhbandner, 
2017). Furthermore, we are also interested in investigating potential selection mechanisms. 
Apparently, not all incoming information is stored in long-term memory so that it is im-
portant to unravel the mechanisms by which the perceptual long-term memory system sep-
arates important from unimportant information (e.g., Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009; Swal-
low & Jiang, 2010). 
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2.3 Study 3 – Why Is There So Much More Research on Vision Than on Any Other 
Sensory Modality? 
 
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced version of an article published 2019 in Frontiers in Psychology 
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or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are 
credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. 
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. 
 
Abstract 
Why is there so much more research on vision than on any other sensory modality? There is 
a seemingly easy answer to this question: It is because vision is our most important and most 
complex sense. Although there are arguments in favor of this explanation, it can be chal-
lenged in two ways: by showing that the arguments regarding the importance and complexity 
of vision are debatable and by demonstrating that there are other aspects that need to be taken 
into account. Here, I argue that the explanation is debatable, as there are various ways of 
defining “importance” and “complexity” and, as considering these different definitions 
proves, there is no clear consensus that vision is indeed the most important and most complex 
of our senses. Hence, I propose two additional explanations: According to the methodolog-
ical-structural explanation, there is more research on vision because the available, present-
day technology is better suited for studying vision than for studying other modalities – an 
advantage which most likely is the result of an initial bias towards vision, which reinforces 
itself. Possible reasons for such an initial bias are discussed. The cultural explanation em-
phasizes that the dominance of the visual is not an unchangeable constant, but rather the 
result of the way our societies are designed and thus heavily influenced by human decision-
making. As it turns out, there is no universal hierarchy of the senses, but great historical and 
cross-cultural variation. Realizing that the dominance of the visual is socially and culturally 
reinforced and not simply a law of nature, gives us the opportunity to take a step back and 
to think about the kind of sensory environments we want to create and about the kinds of 
theories that need to be developed in research. 
Keywords: visual dominance, visuo-centrism, visual turn, social constructionism, history of 
the senses, multimodal integration, perception 
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Why Is There So Much More Research on Vision Than on Any Other Sensory Modal-
ity? 
It has already been observed, about a hundred years ago, that research on perception and 
perceptual memory often in fact is research on visual perception and visual memory, while 
other sensory modalities play a minor role (Katz, 1925/1989). Gallace and Spence (2009) 
supported this observation with empirical data. When searching the PsycINFO database for 
studies containing “visual”, “auditory”, “gustatory”, “olfactory” or “tactile/haptic memory” 
in the title, they found two interesting results. First, there were more studies on visual 
memory than studies on the memory of all other sensory modalities combined. Second, while 
there were still a considerable number of studies on auditory memory, research on olfactory, 
gustatory, and haptic memory was even more limited. I repeated the same search for this 
paper (see Fig. 1A). As Gallace and Spence (2009) conducted their search more than ten 
years ago, I also added the data for the past decade (see Fig. 1B; note that an updated version 
of the graph containing data until the end of 2010 is presented by the authors themselves in 
Gallace & Spence, 2014, p. 112). The pattern has remained the same. If anything, the pro-
portion of studies on visual memory has increased (from 68.04% among the studies con-
ducted until 2007 to 77.46% among the studies conducted since the beginning of 2008).1 
The question is: Why? Why is there so much more research on vision than on any 
other sensory modality? There is a seemingly easy answer to this question, which I will call 
the “textbook explanation”: Vision is our most important and most complex sensory modal-
ity and this is mirrored in the number of studies. Although there are indeed arguments in 
favor of the textbook explanation, I will show that this answer alone is too simplistic for at 
least two reasons. First, the textbook explanation is debatable insofar as the notion that vision 
is our most important and most complex sensory modality depends on the definition of “im-
portance” and “complexity”. Second, the textbook explanation is incomplete as there are 
further explanations to be considered: (a) the idea that the dominance of the visual has meth-
odological-structural reasons, and (b) the observation that the importance ascribed to the 
different sensory modalities varies across times and cultures. Hence, the impression that vi-
sion is our most important sensory modality flows partially, at least, from the fact that con-
temporary Western societies are visual societies and that researchers from these countries 
still dominate the scientific discourse in psychology. 
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The Textbook Explanation 
If you open a textbook on perception or cognitive psychology, you will realize that normally 
more chapters are dedicated to vision than to any other modality (e.g. Goldstein, 2010; Kan-
del, Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2017). Apparently, this decision 
seems self-evident to the authors and is thus often either not explained at all or explained 
only briefly. Sternberg and Sternberg (2017) simply state, for instance, that “vision is the 
most widely recognized and the most widely studied perceptual modality” (p. 72) while 
Kandel et al. (2000) claim that “[m]ost of our impressions about the world and our memories 
of it are based on sight” (p. 492). In the same spirit, Gerrig and Zimbardo (2008) write that 
“[v]ision it the most complex, highly developed, and important sense for humans and most 
other mobile creatures” (p. 103). A more detailed explanation of this idea can be found in a 
chapter on perception by Pike, Edgar, and Edgar (2012): 
[That there has been far more research on vision] is because when we interact with 
the world we rely more on vision than on our other senses. As a result, far more of 
the primate brain is engaged in processing visual information than in processing in-
formation from any of the other senses. (p. 67) 
The last two quotes contain the two elements of what I will call the “textbook explanation”. 
According to the textbook explanation, there is so much research on vision compared to 
research on the other modalities (1) because vision is more important than other modalities 
for our daily experience as well as the way we interact with the world and (2) because the 
processing of visual information is far more complex and occupies larger parts of our brain 
than the processing of sensory information from other modalities. 
In fact, a wide range of evidence supports these two claims. As far as the importance 
of vision is concerned, two kinds of importance have to be distinguished: the subjective im-
portance, that is the importance of a certain sensory modality from a first-person perspective, 
and the empirical importance, that is the importance of a certain sensory modality when it 
comes to processing and remembering information as well as navigating through the world. 
Let us examine both and let us begin with the subjective importance. 
When asked to rate the extent to which different modalities are part of the experience 
with objects, most people put vision first (Schifferstein, 2006; Schifferstein, Otten, Thoolen, 
& Hekkert, 2010; Tranel, Logan, Frank, & Damasio, 1997). Although these studies indicate 
that vision is indeed the most important modality for most people from a subjective point of 
view, one can address this question even more directly: Imagine losing one of your sensory 
modalities. Losing which modality does scare you the most? I conducted a survey asking 
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exactly this question (N = 91, 63 females, 27 males, 1 diverse, age 19-62 years, Mage = 29.44, 
SDage = 10.96). For the overwhelming majority of people the answer is vision (73.63%). The 
pattern across the different modalities (see Fig. 2) is similar to the pattern for the number of 
studies conducted in each sensory modality (see above, Fig. 1). This similarity suggests a 
straightforward answer to the question as to why there is so much more research on vision 
than on any other sensory modality: People tend to investigate those modalities that are most 
important to them. Interestingly, the subjective dominance of the visual is also reflected in 
language. As demonstrated by Winter, Perlman, and Majid (2018), there is a higher fre-
quency of visual words and a greater number of unique visual words compared to words for 
other sensory modalities in a wide range of English corpora. As it has been argued that the 
vocabulary of a language is optimized for satisfying the communicative needs of their speak-
ers (for a discussion of this idea in the context of colors see e.g. Berlin & Kay, 1969; Cook, 
Kay, & Regier, 2005), these results seem to mirror the subjective importance of the visual. 
The idea that vision is indeed the most important modality is supported by numerous 
studies demonstrating visual dominance (for a meta-analysis see Hirst, Cragg, & Allen, 
2018; for a recent philosophical account see Stokes & Biggs, 2014). The term “visual dom-
inance” refers to the observation that information from different senses is not treated equally. 
Rather, the processing of visual information seems to dominate the processing of information 
from other modalities. The reasons for this are still debated. While some argue that visual 
dominance flows from the fact that vision is more accurate and reliable than the other senses, 
others argue that the opposite is true and that people have to focus on visual input, because 
of its rather weak capacity to alert the organism to its occurrence (see Posner, Nissen, & 
Klein, 1976, for the classic and Spence, Shore, & Klein, 2001, for an updated elaboration of 
the latter view). One famous example of visual dominance is the so-called “Colavita effect” 
(Colavita, 1974; Colavita, Tomko, & Weisberg, 1976; for a recent review see Spence, Parise, 
& Chen, 2012). When a visual and an auditory stimulus are presented simultaneously, par-
ticipants show a strong tendency to respond to the visual stimulus. Even more, participants 
frequently report not having perceived the auditory stimulus at all. The finding of visual 
dominance over auditory stimuli has also been extended to visual dominance over haptic 
stimuli (Hecht & Reiner, 2009; for earlier attempts see Rock & Harris, 1967; Rock & Victor, 
1964).  
Hence, evaluating both the subjective as well as the empirical importance of the dif-
ferent sensory modalities seems to lead to the conclusion that vision is more important than 
the other modalities. However, what about complexity? The core idea of the complexity 
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argument is simple: A large part of the human – or more generally speaking: primate – neo-
cortex is involved in processing visual information, while information from other sensory 
modalities is processed in far smaller brain regions. When investigating the macaque neo-
cortex, for instance, it turned out that 54% of the macaque neocortex are involved in visual 
processing (Van Essen, Felleman, DeYoe, Olavarria, & Knierim, 1990). In contrast, only a 
small fraction of the neocortex is exclusively dedicated to auditory (3%) or somatosensory 
processing (11%). To this, it can be added that the estimated number of sensors and afferents 
as well as the information transmission rate is higher for vision than for any other sensory 
modality (see Zimmerman, 1989). Thus, one may argue that the greater “brain power” avail-
able for processing visual information allows for a more fine-grained analysis of the incom-
ing visual stimulation compared to the stimulation from other modalities. 
 
Questioning the Textbook Explanation 
The textbook explanation can be challenged in two ways: by showing that the arguments 
regarding the importance and complexity of vision are debatable and by demonstrating that 
the textbook explanation is incomplete as there are other aspects that need to be considered. 
 
Why the Textbook Explanation Is Debatable: Importance 
At first glance, it appears obvious why the vast majority of participants, in the survey re-
ported above, stated that they are most afraid of losing their visual abilities. Just imagine for 
one moment, how vital vision is for most of your daily activities, ranging from hobbies (e.g. 
reading, watching a movie, playing tennis) and daily routines (e.g. grocery shopping, going 
by car or bike, cleaning your apartment) to your work environment (e.g. writing mails, work-
ing on your computer, administering any kind of machine). However, our present-day soci-
eties offer a wide range of support to blind people so that they can remain active members 
of their community. Although losing sight may be perceived as a traumatic event and alt-
hough it profoundly changes the way one interacts with the world, it does normally not en-
danger the survival of the individual – and probably not even its social integration.  
Now imagine – for comparison – losing your haptic abilities: You would not feel 
anything when hugging your loved ones or when caressing their faces; you could not tell 
whether your back hurts or whether you are comfortably seated; you would not notice when 
stepping barefoot on a piece of broken glass (unless you see the blood coming from you 
wound), and so on. In short, you would be deprived of some of the most important and most 
intimate aspects that come with the fact that human beings are physical beings that are – 
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literally – in touch with the world, not to forget that losing the sense of touch would drasti-
cally diminish the ability to detect dangers for the physical integrity. In this context, it is 
interesting to consider congenital insensitivity to pain, a very rare condition in which people 
are – as the name already suggests – insensitive to pain from birth onwards (for a review see 
Nagasako, Oaklander, & Dworkin, 2001). Although these people have no cognitive defects, 
they often die in childhood and generally have a decreased life expectancy. It is easy to see 
why: 
[These people are not] able to determine if a bone is broken or if they have bitten off 
the tip of their tongue unless they see the swelling of the surrounding tissue or taste 
blood in their mouth. Because of this inability to sense pain, it is common for patients 
with congenital insensitivity to pain to have unseen infections as well as have a mul-
titude of bruises, wounds, and broken bones over their lifetime. (Hellier, 2016, p. 
118) 
Thus, it seems that – at least in our present-day societies – haptic abilities such as the ability 
to sense pain are more important for our survival than visual abilities. In line with this, it has 
also been hypothesized that physical contact is a necessary precondition for the healthy de-
velopment of the individual. Skin-to-skin contact between the mother and the infant in the 
first hour after birth has vital advantages for short- and long-term health (Klaus, Jerauld, 
Kreger, McAlpine, Steffa, & Kennell, 1972; for a recent review see Widström, Brimdyr, 
Svensson, Cadwell, & Nissen, 2019). As this effect may rather be due to the formation of an 
emotional bond which is facilitated through skin-to-skin contact rather than due to the skin-
to-skin contact per se, it is interesting to consider another developmental issue: At birth, our 
visual system is severely underdeveloped. Hence, in the first months of their lives, newborns 
need to learn to make sense of the incoming visual information. As the sense of touch already 
plays a crucial role for the unborn child, it seems legitimate so speculate that newborns use 
their well-developed sense of touch to achieve this (see Grunwald, 2017; Martin, 1992). In 
fact, it has been demonstrated that newborns can extract the shape of an object by haptically 
exploring it and that they can transfer this knowledge so that they are able to visually recog-
nize the same object they had only touched before (Sann & Streri, 2007; Streri & Gentaz, 
2003; 2004). In addition, remember that many of the newborn reflexes such as the grasp or 
suck reflex are shown as a response to being touched. From this perspective, one may argue 
that our sense of touch is more important than our sense of vision as the former plays an 
essential role in the development of the latter (see e.g. Gottlieb, 1971, for an ontogenetic 
account of sensory function). In particular, it has been argued that “early tactile experiences 
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[…] might strongly contribute to shaping and characterizing the emotional, relational, cog-
nitive, and neural functioning of the adult individual” (Gallace & Spence, 2014, p. 178). 
Note, that these remarks about the importance of haptics are not meant to establish a 
haptic-centered version of the textbook explanation claiming that haptics should be treated 
as the most important sensory modality. Rather, I have tried to show that it is far more diffi-
cult to decide which sensory modality is most important for human beings than one may at 
first think. In fact, it is a matter of perspective; it is a matter of the aspects taken into consid-
eration (for an example of differences between people see Delwiche, 2003). Interestingly, 
the reported differences between vision and haptics may be the result of the fact that vision 
is a distant sense while touch is a proximal sense (for this distinction see e.g. Katz, 
1925/1989; Klatzky & Lederman, 2011; Rodaway, 1994; Trope & Liberman, 2010).2 Ex-
pressed in plain words, touch gives us information about the way our body is embedded in 
the environment. Touch is an integral part of the existential experience of being a physical 
creature (see e.g. O’Shaughnessy, 1989). At the same time, we are consciously unaware of 
most of our haptic sensations: You can direct your attention towards your feet in order to 
find out how they feel in your shoes right now. If you are not intentionally directing your 
attention towards your haptic sensations, however, you will not notice them most of the time 
(until someone taps you on your shoulder or you take a hot shower on a cold winter day). 
Compare this to vision: As long as you are awake, it is hard to prevent the visual impressions 
and changes in your environment from entering your consciousness – no matter how relevant 
or irrelevant this information may be for your current goals.3 That is because vision as a 
distant sense informs us about the surroundings; it informs us about the world. Thus, vision 
is especially important when it comes to actively exploring and navigating in this world:  
A view comprehends many things juxtaposed, as co-existent parts of one field of 
vision. It does so in an instant: as in a flash one glance, an opening of the eyes, dis-
closes a world of co-present qualities spread out in space, ranged in depth, continuing 
into indefinite distance […]. (Jonas, 1954, p. 507)  
Put differently, vision as a distant sense has a qualitatively different function than touch as 
a proximal sense. This qualitative difference renders conclusions about the absolute im-
portance of a given sensory modality almost impossible. In this context, one may addition-
ally consider olfaction: “Often, we rely on our sense of smell in order to decide whether or 
not it is safe to engage further with a given stimulus” (Gallace, Ngo, Sulaitis, & Spence, 
2012, p. 16). Thus, although smell may play a rather minor role in everyday life, it becomes 
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extremely important in potentially harmful or even life-threatening situations, such as deter-
mining whether some food is rotten, detecting a gas leak or smelling fire. 
In short, the degree to which vision dominates the research on the different sensory 
modalities cannot simply be explained by claiming that vision is the most important modal-
ity. As it will turn out in the next section, the same applies to the complexity argument. 
 
Why the Textbook Explanation Is Debatable: Complexity 
The complexity argument was based on the assumption that a large part of the human brain 
is specialized on visual processing while relatively small parts are specialized on processing 
information from other sensory modalitities. This assumption has been questioned in recent 
years: Instead of regarding the senses as strictly separated entities, it has become quite com-
mon to accept that they often interact and influence each other, which is also mirrored in the 
neural underpinnings (for reviews see e.g. Alais, Newell, & Mamassian, 2010; Ghazanfar & 
Schroeder, 2006). It has even been argued that the multisensory nature of the neocortex may 
force us “to abandon the notion that the senses ever operate independently during real-world 
cognition” (Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 2006, p. 278). Interestingly, multisensory integration 
does not only occur in the later brain regions in the temporal and frontal cortices, but also in 
earlier brain regions and even in the primary sensory cortices. Moreover, brain regions pre-
viously believed to be visual by nature are used during Braille reading (e.g. Sadato, Pascual-
Leone, Grafman, Ibañez, Deiber, Dold, & Hallett, 1996; Büchel, Price, Frackowiak, & Fris-
ton, 1998) and for processing auditory information (e.g. Burton, Snyder, Conturo, Akbudak, 
Ollinger, & Raichle, 2002; Röder, Stock, Bien, Neville, & Rösler 2002) in blind people. As 
multisensory processing appears to be the rule rather than the exception, claiming that a large 
part of the human brain is exclusively specialized for processing visual information seems 
at least debatable (see e.g. Shimojo & Shams, 2001) – or as Lacey and Sathian (2008) put it: 
“The crossmodal activity of visual cortex likely reflects modality-independent representa-
tions of objects and other stimuli such as motion […]. Such findings increase support for the 
idea of a ‘metamodal’ brain organized around task processing rather than separate sensory 
streams” (p. 257). 
However, this line of reasoning is not the only way to question the complexity argu-
ment: Why should the size of brain regions specialized on processing information from a 
certain modality be the only criterion at all, when it comes to determining complexity? One 
could also take into account the number of different receptor cells, for instance: While hu-
mans have only two major classes of photoreceptor cells (rods and three kinds of cones), 
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they possess several hundred different kinds of olfactory receptor cells (Axel, 1995; Glus-
man, Yanai, Rubin, & Lancet, 2001) and can discriminate more than one trillion olfactory 
stimuli (Bushdid, Magnasco, Vosshall, & Keller, 2014). Alternatively, remember that the 
skin is the largest sensory organ of the human body, accounting for more than a tenth of total 
body weight (Field, 2001; Martini & Nath, 2009; Montagu, 1971). Again, these examples 
are not meant to claim that vision is definitely not the most complex modality, but rather that 
there are various ways of defining complexity (for an attempt to distinguish different mean-
ings of complexity in the chemical senses see Spence & Wang, 2018). Moreover, no defini-
tion presented here seems to provide clear evidence that vision is beyond any doubt the most 
complex sensory modality. As both the importance and complexity argument are insufficient 
for explaining the degree to which vision dominates the research on the different sensory 
modalities, it seems necessary to look for other possible explanations. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
Here, I present and discuss two additional explanations which can help illuminating the bias 
towards vision in research. The methodological-structural explanation claims that research 
on vision is often easier than research on other modalities and that this the result of an initial 
bias towards vision that reinforces itself; the cultural explanation carves out that the domi-
nance of the visual is not a historical constant, but rather a result of the way (Western) soci-
eties are designed. 
 
The Methodological-Structural Explanation 
Imagine having to set up an experiment that investigates long-term memory for everyday 
objects. If you decided to present the objects visually on a computer screen, your task would 
be straightforward: Use your favorite search engine and collect as many images of as many 
different objects as possible. Instead, you may also refer to one of the publicly available 
databases, offering thousands and thousands of images (see e.g. Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & 
Oliva, 2008; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010). If you decided to present the objects 
haptically, your task would be much harder: Even if you had a list containing the names of 
all objects used in a previous study as well as photos of these objects (e.g. Hutmacher & 
Kuhbandner, 2018), this would be of limited use for your own study, as it would not free 
you from the necessity to buy and collect all the objects on your own. And the struggle 
continues: The objects gathered for haptic presentation will occupy much more space than 
the images of objects stored on your hard drive. Even setting up the actual experiment is 
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easier when working with images presented on a computer screen, as with all programs de-
signed for creating experiments, many potential methodological flaws are easy to avoid. The 
duration of the stimulus presentation can be determined precisely, counterbalancing within 
and between participants is normally achieved with a couple of mouse clicks (or lines of 
code), and the responses of the participants are automatically recorded and coded as correct 
or false. All these things become vastly more difficult when doing the same experiment in-
volving haptic exploration, as the experimenter has to navigate carefully between the objects 
(a wine glass is fragile, the image of a wine glass is not), keep track of the objects that were 
already presented, make sure that the participants do not explore the objects too long, and so 
on. 
In short, while there is a lot of off-the-shelf technology available for studying vision, 
this is not the case for other sensory modalities such as touch (see e.g. Krueger 1989, p. 2, 
reporting personal communication from Lederman). However, this conclusion is not the end 
of the methodological-structural explanation. Instead, one could ask further: What could be 
the reason that the available technology is better suited for studying vision than the other 
modalities? There are two possible answers to this question.  
First, one may argue that vision is by nature easier or that the other senses are by 
nature harder to investigate. Maybe vision has a subtle advantage as it “is the ideal distance-
sense” (Jonas, 1954, p. 517), that is, as it does not only allow for distance to the stimulus 
(light travels farther than sound or smell), but gains by distance as “the best view is by no 
means the closest view” (p. 518) – a feature, which is perfectly suited for the distanced and 
objective perspective of an experimenter (see Classen, 1993). In contrast, it seems hard to 
imagine how there could be off-the shelf technology for studying the chemical senses, for 
instance: Although researchers have tried to, no one has yet found a digital way of stimulat-
ing the chemical senses, which would be an important precondition for setting up standard-
ized and easily controllable experiments (see Spence, Obrist, Velasco, & Ranasinghe, 2017). 
The same can be said about haptic long-term memory: Whoever wants to study the haptic 
exploration of everyday objects will have to collect the respective objects. There seems to 
be no way around this.  
Even if there is a way around this in some cases, however, the tools developed to 
study other senses such as touch (see e.g. Grunwald, Ettrich, Busse, Assmann, Dähne, & 
Gertz, 2002; Mueller, Winkelmann, Krause, & Grunwald, 2014), are not widely spread and 
were constructed by the authors in a laborious process in order to test their hypotheses (see 
Grunwald, 2017). Rather than demonstrating that present-day technology used to investigate 
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haptics is equal to the technology to investigate vision, these efforts to create adequate in-
struments in the absence of an established technology remind of the situation at the end of 
the 19th century, when the first experimental psychological laboratories were founded (see 
e.g. Caudle, 1983; Schoenherr, 2017). At that time, creating tools for research on vision was 
a laborious process. Hence, one can get the impression that the development of haptic tech-
nology lags behind in time. 
This observation leads to the second answer to the question as to why the available 
technology is better suited for studying vision than the other modalities: The “Matthew ef-
fect” (Merton, 1968) describes the fact that the networks of science are designed in a way 
that creates more attention for (and allocates more rewards to) already well-known research-
ers and well-established research topics while rather unknown fields and scientists remain 
largely unnoticed. Thus, one could hypothesize that instead of (or at least in addition to) 
being naturally better suited for investigation, vision may have had an arbitrary advantage 
in the beginning of experimental research and that this initial advantage has perpetuated and 
possibly even reinforced itself since then. Classen, Howes, and Synnott (1994) confirm the 
idea of a Matthew effect in the research on different modalities by comparing the status of 
vision to the status of smell: “While the high status of sight in the West makes it possible for 
studies on vision and visuality […] to be taken seriously, any attempt to examine smell runs 
the risk of being brushed off as frivolous and irrelevant” (p. 5). Expressed differently, fund-
ing for research into vision might be much easier to obtain than funding for smell or touch. 
This might in turn bias researches towards doing research on vision as it is easier to get 
funding, and so on. 
There are various possible reasons why the study of vision may have had an ad-
vantage in the beginning of experimental research: (1) researchers at the time may have had 
personal reasons to study vision instead of other modalities (e.g. because they had the sub-
jective impression that vision is their most important modality); (2) researchers may have 
been biased towards vision due to a long history of visual dominance in Western societies 
(see the next section); (3) apparently, “early psychologists enthusiastically borrowed and 
adapted the scientific instruments that had heretofore been used to explore problems related 
to the physical laws of acoustics and optics and the physiology of the sense organs” (Caudle, 
1983, p. 20-21), almost automatically leading to research focusing on vision and hearing;4 
(4) vision may have a special appeal to scientists as it appears more objective to modern 
scientists following empiricist traditions than the other senses (see above): “The detachment 
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of sight, distancing spectator from spectacle, makes the cherished objectivity of the scientist 
possible” (Classen, 1993, p 6). 
In conclusion, the methodological-structural explanation claims that there is more 
research on vision because the available, present-day technology is better suited for studying 
vision than for studying other modalities. Although one may claim that vision is easier to 
investigate by nature, it seems quite likely that this claim and thus the technological ad-
vantage for vision is at least partially the result of a Matthew effect: As there is more research 
on and easier accessible technology for vision compared to other modalities today, there will 
most likely be more research on and technology for vision tomorrow. In addition to the self-
perpetuating process proposed by the Matthew effect, there may also be a cultural explana-
tion for the bias towards vision. 
 
The Cultural Explanation 
At first sight, one may think of visual dominance as a cultural constant that can be traced 
back to antiquity (for a history of the senses see e.g. Classen, 1993; Jütte, 2005). When Plato 
writes about the senses, for instance, he puts the greatest emphasis on vision, which he even 
describes as “divine” in one place (see Jütte, 2005, p. 35). Generally speaking, he favors the 
supposedly more rational “higher senses” vision and audition over the other “lower senses”, 
which he believed to be more subjective and bound to bodily reactions (see e.g. Schellekens, 
2009). In a similar manner, Aristotle creates a ranking of the senses, putting vision first, 
followed by hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Although subsequent philosophers did not agree 
with the classical Aristotelian hierarchy in every respect, vision is almost always ranked as 
the highest sense in Western societies throughout the medieval ages up until today. In this 
context, it is especially interesting that the study on the frequency of words referring to the 
different sensory modalities quoted above, did not only find an overall higher frequency of 
visual words in the investigated English corpora. When looking at the average frequencies 
for each modality based on the ten most exclusive words per modality, there was hardly any 
change in the past 200 years (see Winter et al., 2018, Fig. 5), suggesting that the hierarchy 
of the senses remained unchanged. 
Although the Aristotelian hierarchy has undeniably had a huge influence on the con-
ceptualizations of generation upon generation of philosophers and although one may argue 
that there is a long history of visual dominance, matters become vastly more complicated 
when taking a closer look at the available sources. First, although positioning vision first in 
his hierarchy, Aristotle also states that the sense of touch is “much more closely related than 
59 
 
the other senses to the four elements, since the properties of the elements (dry, wet, cold, 
warm) are all palpable”, leading him to the conclusion “that without the sense of touch there 
could be no other senses” (Jütte, 2005, p. 42) – an idea Thomas Aquinas agreed with more 
than a thousand years later. Thus, one could claim that the hierarchy proclaimed by Aristotle 
was not meant to be interpreted that strictly after all. This idea is in line with Avicenna’s 
view on Aristotle. As the medieval, Persian polymath “understood it, what Aristotle meant 
was that with respect to honour the primacy of the sense of sight applied, but that from the 
point of view of natural aptitude the sense of touch merited priority” (Jütte, 2005, p. 69). 
Second, it can be demonstrated that the dominance of the visual – supposedly already exist-
ing in the times of Aristotle – was less pronounced for a long time, that is, that the non-visual 
senses have lost ground against sight in the course of the past centuries. Hence, rather than 
being a cultural constant, visual dominance turns out to be heavily influenced by human 
decision-making. I will illustrate this idea using three different examples. 
First, consider the shift from an oral, hearing-dominated to a written, sight-dominated 
culture (e.g. McLuhan, 1962; Ong, 1967), which was a result of the “Gutenberg Revolution”. 
While knowledge was predominantly transmitted orally before the invention of the printing 
press, vision has become the common means of acquiring information since then. Note, that 
this shift from hearing to sight arguably also changed interactions between people: The oral 
transmission of knowledge – and of literature, by the way – requires at least two people (a 
teacher and a student; someone who is telling a story and someone who is listening to it); in 
contrast, reading a book does not require any personal interactions – you can do it entirely 
on your own. 
Second, take the decrease of the importance of smell. As Classen (1993) points out, 
“[i]n the pre-modern West […], smell was associated with essence and spiritual truth, while 
sight was often deemed a ‘superficial’ sense, revealing only exteriors” (p. 7). Moreover, the 
strength of the odor of a plant was associated with its presumed medical power: In order to 
protect themselves against epidemic diseases such as the plague, people in the medieval ages 
often carried a pomander with them, as they believed that strong scents are an antidote 
against the odors of illness which were considered to be the cause of infection. The idea that 
scents are important was also mirrored in the design of monastery gardens of the time: Flow-
ers were mostly grown for practical purposes, that is for cooking or producing medicine – 
and as their scent rather than their visual appearance was considered to carry its potency, 
they “were grown together with garlic, onions and other herbs and vegetables used in cook-
ing” (p. 22). This slowly changed from the 16th and even more so from the 18th century 
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onward: As the belief in the healing power of scents faded away and as gardens were also 
cultivated for aesthetical and recreational reasons, visuals became increasingly more im-
portant.5 In a similar spirit, it has recently been argued that the idea that humans have a poor 
sense of smell “derives not from empirical studies of human olfaction but from a famous 
19th-century anatomist’s [Paul Broca] hypothesis that the evolution of human free will re-
quired a reduction in the proportional size of the brain’s olfactory bulb” (McGann, 2017, p. 
1). In contrast to this hypothesis, it has been shown that the olfactory abilities of humans are 
in fact quite good. 
Third, imagine walking through a modern museum exhibiting sculptures: You would 
probably not in your wildest dreams think of touching these sculptures – and if you did, 
security guards, alarms, not to-be-crossed lines on the floor or transparent cases around the 
sculptures would remind you immediately that art is not to be touched (see Gallace & 
Spence, 2014 for the few contemporary counterexamples). In contrast to this, it has been 
observed that in medieval culture, sculptures were “far more publicly accessible” (Jung, 
2010, p. 215). One may even say that sculptures were meant to be touched: “[M]edieval 
people stroked, held, and cradled sculptural representations” (Griffiths & Starkey, 2018, p. 
9). Note, that remnants of these haptic worshipping traditions have survived until today: The 
right foot of the bronze statue of St. Peter in the St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome is worn down 
by pilgrims who have touched and kissed it for centuries, for instance (for a description of 
similar rituals see Frijhoff, 1993). 
As these three examples demonstrate, one can trace an ongoing shift towards vision 
throughout history. However, the bias towards vision may be even more pronounced in our 
present-day societies than ever before: Beginning with the invention of movies, cinema, and 
television and even more so in the face of the omnipresence of smartphones and computers, 
visual technologies increasingly regulate our daily lives:  
Modern life takes place onscreen. […] Human experience is now more visual and 
visualized than ever before from the satellite picture to medical images of the interior 
of the human body. […] In this swirl of imagery, seeing is much more than believing. 
It is not just a part of everyday life, it is everyday life. (Mirzoeff, 1999, p. 1) 
To give one illustrative example, consider the now-common habit of taking a picture of your 
meal and of sharing it on social media before starting to eat. It has been hypothesized that 
this habit has profoundly changed the way restaurants are recommended. While recommen-
dations used to be based on the opinion of friends and colleagues or on written reports in 
newspapers, magazines or reference guides like the famous “Guide Michelin”, they are now 
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increasingly based on the visual appearance of the food. This may ultimately lead chefs and 
restaurant owners to pay more attention to the visual arrangement of the food they serve, or 
even to prepare the food in a way that is going to look good on Instagram (see e.g. Lee, 2017; 
Saner, 2015; Spence, Okajima, Cheok, Petit, & Michel, 2016; for an experimental investi-
gation of the importance of the orientation in the plating of food see Michel, Woods, Neu-
häuser, Landgraf, & Spence, 2015). More broadly speaking, paying attention to visual as-
pects seems crucial to achieve important goals in life such as finding a job or a partner as 
well as improving social relationships – just think of the importance of visuals when pre-
senting oneself on an online dating website, sharing holiday pictures on social media or ap-
plying for a job with a well-designed resume. In accordance with these kind of phenomena, 
the necessity of a “visual” or “pictorial turn” has been proclaimed in the cultural sciences 
(see e.g. Alloa, 2016; Boehm, 1994; Boehm & Mitchell, 2009; Mitchell, 1994). Such a visual 
turn can supposedly have a double function: it can account for the dominance of the visual 
by emphasizing the importance of research on the topic and it can help to create both an 
appropriate methodology to investigate and appropriate theories to describe the visual turn.  
Overall, it seems that the dominance of the visual is not a cultural constant. It should 
not be forgotten, however, that everything that has been discussed so far primarily referred 
to – pre-modern, modern, and postmodern – Western cultures and societies. As it will turn 
out, considering non-Western societies only confirms the ideas presented so far: The domi-
nance of the visual is at least partially the result of human decision-making and should thus 
not be regarded as an unvarying historical constant. Two examples shall suffice to illustrate 
the enormous cross-cultural variability. 
First, a recent study has demonstrated that there is no universal hierarchy of the 
senses by investigating 20 different languages including three unrelated sign languages 
(Majid et al., 2018). The authors created stimulus sets for each of the five Aristotelian sen-
sory modalities and asked their participants to describe them (What color is this? What sound 
is this?) in order to find out how detailed these stimuli are coded in each language. Apart 
from the fact that smell is poorly coded in most languages, there was no common hierarchy 
of the senses. While English indeed seems to have a visual bias (see the study by Winter et 
al., 2018, discussed above), other languages seem to have a gustatory bias (e.g. Turkish and 
Farsi) or a bias towards touch (e.g. Dogul Dom spoken in Mali and Siwu spoken in Ghana). 
Thus, the authors conclude, “that the mapping of language into senses is culturally relative” 
(p. 11374) and that “either by cultural tradition or by ecological adaptation, each language 
has come to concentrate its efforts on particular sensory domains” (p. 11375). 
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Second, let us examine one of the cultures for which sound seems to be more im-
portant than vision: the culture of the Songhay of Niger. It is important to note, that for them, 
sound is not only important because like in any oral culture, knowledge is transmitted by 
spoken words, but because the sounds of the words themselves are believed to carry energy 
and power: 
[The Songhay] believe that sound, being an existential phenomenon in and of itself, 
can be the carrier of powerful forces. […] We take the sound of language for granted. 
[The Songhay] consider language […] as an embodiment of sound which practition-
ers can use to bring rain to a parched village or to maim or kill their enemies. (Stoller, 
1984, p. 569) 
Thus, for the Songhay, “signifiers can function independently of their signifieds” (Howes, 
1991, p. 10), that is, the meaning of a word and its sound can be separated and perform 
different functions. 
What can we learn from considering the cultural explanation regarding the question 
why there is so much more research on vision than on any other sensory modality? The 
answer is quite simple: Living in a visual society means living in a society placing high value 
on vision and comparably little value on the other senses – a tendency that is mirrored in the 
number of studies on vision. Put differently, a society placing higher value on the other 
senses would probably develop more balanced research agendas (i.e. research agendas in 
which the bias towards vision would be less pronounced). 
 
Conclusion: Living in a Visual Society and the Need for Integration 
Why is there so much more research on vision than on any other sensory modality? This 
paper has discussed three different explanations. The only explanation that can be found in 
contemporary books on perception and cognitive psychology, which I have called the text-
book explanation, claims that the reason for the bias towards vision is its importance and 
complexity. Although there are arguments in favor of this explanation, the validity of these 
arguments seems debatable as it crucially depends on the definition of importance and com-
plexity. Apart from that, the textbook explanation is at least incomplete as there are other 
aspects that need to be taken into consideration. As the methodological-structural explana-
tion proposes, the present-day technology is better suited for studying vision than for study-
ing other modalities, which may be the result of a Matthew effect reinforcing the advantage 
of the visual. In addition to that, the cultural explanation suggests that the dominance of the 
visual is not an historical constant, neither in Western nor in non-Western societies, and 
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should consequently be viewed as being influenced human decision-making. In my opinion, 
there a two important lessons to be learned from this outcome: the necessity of diversity and 
the necessity of integration. Let us consider both. 
First, the necessity of diversity: Diversity is not necessarily good per se. In the event 
that there was in fact one modality, which is much more important and complex than all the 
others, a research bias towards this modality would be perfectly understandable (and a visual 
turn advisable). As “[a]ny classification of the senses is first and foremost an analytical de-
vice, a simplification and an abstraction” (Rodaway, 1994, p. 28), however, and as the dom-
inance of the visual is at least partially a cultural construction, a call for more diversity seems 
justified. This is not only because the other senses deserve more attention, but also because 
the theories of perception and perceptual memory developed from studies on vision may in 
fact be theories on visual perception and visual memory, which do not capture the peculiar-
ities of the other senses (see e.g. Barwich, 2019; Batty, 2011). It has been shown, for exam-
ple, that “studies of multisensory processing have focused on a narrow region of space in 
front of the observer” (van der Stoep, Serino, Farnè, Di Luca, & Spence, 2016, p. 513), that 
is, that even the way non-visual stimuli are presented seems to be biased due to the domi-
nance of vision in research. Thus, basing our theories of perception and perceptual memory 
mainly on vision may indeed lead to limited and impoverished conceptualizations of percep-
tual memory. As O’Callaghan (2011) puts it: “Attention to just one sense is bad policy if 
we’re after a comprehensive and general account of perception, rather than a parochial story 
about vision” (p. 143). 
Second, the necessity of integration: Although I have not explicitly stated this, the 
ideas presented in the present paper were by and large in line with the Aristotelian view that 
humans possess five senses. No more than the hierarchy of the senses, however, the number 
of postulated senses is the same across times and cultures (see e.g. Gold, 1980; Jütte, 2005). 
Rather, it seems that “[f]rom the invention of the alphabet there has been a continuous drive 
in the Western world toward the separation of the senses, of functions, of operations, of 
states emotional and political, as well as of tasks” (McLuhan, 1962, p. 42-43). Given that 
the different sensory modalities share significant parts of their neural underpinnings, given 
that the processing of information seems to be rather multimodal than unimodal, and given 
that our everyday experience is characterized by the concurrent stimulation of our senses, 
investigating their interactions seems more promising than trying to make more and more 
fine-grained distinctions (for the attempt to say more about the different kinds of interactions 
between the senses see e.g. Fulkerson, 2014).  
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Indeed, it has been shown that the integration and combination of the senses can have 
an important impact on educational outcomes (see e.g. Keehner, & Lowe, 2010; Reid, 
Shapiro, & Louw, 2019) – not to forget that multisensory integration plays a crucial role in 
several research areas on high-level cognition, such as the interactions between perception 
and action or embodied cognition. In the field of embodied cognition, for example, it is be-
lieved that “cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body 
with various sensorimotor capacities, and […] that these individual sensorimotor capacities 
are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural 
context” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 173), that is, that cognition cannot be un-
derstood without understanding the co-presence of these various sensorimotor capacities (for 
a similar, early account see Gibson, 1979; for a more recent perspective on embodied cog-
nition see Shapiro, 2011). 
All in all, investigating the seemingly easy to answer question as to why there is so 
much more research on vision than on any other sensory modality does not only lead us right 
into the middle of historical changes and cultural differences, but also gives us the oppor-
tunity to take a step back and to start thinking about visual dominance. If the degree to which 
vision dominates research on the different sensory modalities is not an unchangeable neces-
sity, what kind of sensory environments do we want to create and what kind of research do 
we want to conduct? 
 
Footnotes 
1When speaking about “visual memory”, “auditory memory”, etc., I do not simply mean 
“memory for information acquired through vision/audition”, but memory for the perceptual 
qualities of a certain stimulation (i.e. perceptual memory). 
2Although the distinction between distant and proximal senses is well established in the lit-
erature, one may argue that the distinction is not that strict after all, as one can feel the sun 
(i.e. a distant stimulus) one one’s back, for instance. 
3This does not imply that we are consciously aware of all visual information. As phenomena 
like change blindness (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997) or inattentional amnesia (Simons 
& Chabris, 1999) demonstrate, we often miss even significant changes in our surroundings. 
Nevertheless, vision seems to capture a far greater percentage of our attention than the other 
modalities (for an intuitive rule of thumb see Heilig, 1992). 
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4The idea that the available technology mediates how research questions are investigated, 
can also be made clear by looking at the history of attention research, for instance: For var-
ious theoretical reasons, but also because “multi-channel tape recorders became available at 
the time and provided an elegant way of presenting stimuli”, nearly all “all the early exper-
iments on attention used auditory” (Styles, 2006, p. 16). This only began to change when 
computers started to spread all over the world. 
5Just as the “eye-minded philosophy of the Enlightenment” (Classen, 1993, p. 27) changed 
the way of structuring and organizing gardens, it also changed the way people approached 
anatomical drawings (Massey, 2017), that is not only the way people thought about the non-
visual senses, but also the way they thought about vision itself. Before the 18th century, there 
had been no apparent conflict between aesthetically appealing and practically useful ana-
tomical drawings of the human body. Anatomical drawings were largely based on the writ-
ings of Galen and often contained allegorical depictions to foster the understanding of the 
human body. One may even say that the anatomical drawings – although being visual, of 
course – were not about being visual in the sense of an accurate depiction of reality, but 
about combining different aspects ranging from natural philosophy to religion and medicine 
as well as about activating different senses (see also Borland, 2018). This began to change 
in the age of Enlightenment: The new norm were accurate drawings based on exact obser-
vations, often made during dissections – while artistic depictions of the human body became 
a clearly separated category of their own. In other words, in the anatomy of the 18th century, 
the visual became important as visual. 
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3. General Discussion 
3.1 Summary of Findings 
In short, Study 1 demonstrates that the memory representations stored in haptic long-term 
memory are detailed and robust over time. In Experiment 1, participants performed remark-
ably well on a memory test that required detailed knowledge about the presented objects in 
order to give a correct answer, no matter whether memory was tested immediately after the 
study phase (94% correct) or one week later (85% correct). In Experiment 2, encoding was 
incidental. However, memory performance was still high: When tested after one week, par-
ticipants gave the correct answer in 79% of the trials (compared to 85% in Experiment 1). 
Interestingly, participants were able to use the incidentally and haptically encoded infor-
mation in a crossmodal visual task with a very high accuracy (73% correct). Thus, after 
having haptically explored an everyday object (such as a pen) for ten seconds while being 
blindfolded, participants were able to distinguish this object from another object from the 
same basic-level category (i.e., another pen) in a purely visual memory test during which 
they were not allowed to touch the objects – although encoding had been incidental and the 
memory test was performed one week after the study phase. Another interesting pattern is 
revealed by the metamemory judgments provided by the participants in Experiment 2: Par-
ticipants performed best when claiming that they had remembered the correct answer (uni-
modal haptic test: 94%, crossmodal visual test: 89%) and worst when claiming that they had 
purely guessed based on their intuition (unimodal haptic test: 66%, crossmodal visual test: 
63%); performance in trials in which the participants had the feeling of knowing the correct 
answer was in between (unimodal haptic test: 78%, crossmodal visual test: 75%). At first 
glance, one may simply take this pattern as indicating that memory performance was better 
the more confident the participants were about their answer in the memory test. However, 
two more aspects need to be considered. First, participants performed very well on trials in 
which they believed they remembered the correct answer. Nonetheless, there was a fraction 
of trials in which participants were misled by their subjective impression of remembering 
the correct answer (unimodal haptic test: 6%, crossmodal visual test: 11%). Second, partic-
ipants performed significantly above chance even on trials in which they had guessed solely 
based on their intuition. Taken together, these two observations both point to the conclusion 
that performance in the memory test was only partially accompanied by conscious awareness 
of their own memory abilities (see section 3.2.1 for a more detailed discussion). 
 Study 2 complements the findings from Study 1 by showing that detailed long-term 
memory representations are formed for incoming – in this case: auditory – information even 
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if this perceptual information was unattended, irrelevant, incidentally encoded, and pro-
cessed in a different modality than the attended information. No matter whether being tested 
immediately after completing the encoding phase or after 24 hours, participants performed 
significantly above chance (immediate test: 57%, delayed test: 56%). While previous studies 
have consistently found that no perceptual information is stored in long-term memory under 
these conditions, Study 2 does not only demonstrate that some information is retained, but 
that detailed information about prior perceptual experiences is retained. The crucial differ-
ence between Study 2 and the previous attempts to investigate the fate of unattended infor-
mation was the way in which memory was tested. In the present study, participants indicated 
which of two sounds they believed they heard before (2AFC), while previous studies used 
old-new recognition tests (ONR), which are less sensitive and rely more on the conscious 
experiences of recollection and familiarity (see, e.g., Voss & Paller, 2010). As demonstrated 
by further analyses, the above-chance performance was driven neither by a few sounds nor 
by temporarily shifting attention from the visual to the auditory stream in the encoding phase. 
Thus, Study 2 challenges the assumption that the allocation of attention to the incoming 
perceptual information is a necessary precondition for storing detailed representations in 
perceptual long-term memory. 
Although Study 1 and 2 were concerned with haptic and auditory long-term memory 
respectively, the vast majority of studies on perceptual long-term memory are studies on 
visual long-term memory. Study 3 shows that this dominance of the visual cannot simply be 
explained by pointing to the ‘importance’ and ‘complexity’ of vision compared to our other 
senses. Both, ‘importance’ and ‘complexity’ are umbrella terms that encompass a wide range 
of different meanings. Importance, for instance, may mean ‘subjective importance’, that is, 
the importance of a sensory modality from a first-person point of view. However, it may also 
mean ‘importance for survival’, ‘importance in everyday life’ or ‘importance for the healthy 
development of a human being’. Considering these different meanings of ‘importance’ leads 
to different conclusions regarding the hierarchy of our senses. As demonstrated in Study 3, 
the same applies to arguments about complexity. Thus, the idea that there is so much more 
research on vision than on any other sensory modality because of the importance and com-
plexity of vision is at least debatable. Apart from that, the answer is incomplete as there are 
other aspects that need to be considered. Study 3 discusses two of them. According to the 
methodological-structural explanation, the bias towards vision can be explained by the fact 
that research on vision is easier to conduct than research on the other senses. Although vision 
may be easier to investigate by nature, it is also possible that the methodological advantage, 
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at least partially, has idiosyncratic reasons and is driven by the way rewards are allocated in 
research. Specifically, there is a tendency to give funding to well-researched topics and to 
be more hesitant to support less prominent fields of research – an attitude that reinforces 
existing biases. The second alternative explanation, the cultural explanation, points to the 
fact that the degree to which vision is perceived as the dominant sense is neither a historical 
nor a cultural constant. Although Western societies have placed a great emphasis on vision 
since antiquity, the importance of vision has arguably increased over time and even more so 
in the last few decades. Apart from that, there is apparently no universal hierarchy of the 
senses. Rather, different cultures place different emphasis on different senses. Taken to-
gether, the explanations discussed in Study 3 provide clear evidence that the dominance of 
the visual is heavily influenced by human decision-making.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Considerations 
The results of the three studies summarized above raise several theoretical issues, which are 
discussed in the following sections: first, the relation between perceptual long-term memory 
and conscious awareness; second, the question as to how perceptual long-term memory is 
related to implicit memory; third, the question as to how one can be sure that the stored 
details were perceptual rather than conceptual as well as the question as to what actually 
constitutes a detail; and fourth, the interactions as well as similarities and differences be-
tween our senses. 
 
3.2.1 Perceptual Long-Term Memory and Conscious Awareness 
As described above, performance in Study 1 was only partially accompanied by conscious 
awareness: Although participants performed very well on trials in which they had the sub-
jective impression of remembering the correct answer, they still gave the wrong answer in a 
fraction of these trials. Even more importantly, participants performed clearly above chance 
on trials in which their answers were based purely on guessing. The notion that perceptual 
long-term memory representations may at least partially be independent from conscious 
awareness is also supported by Study 2. While previous studies using memory tests that rely 
on the conscious processes of recollection and familiarity have found null memory effects 
for irrelevant and unattended perceptual information under high attentional load, the present 
study provides evidence for detailed memory representations when using a more sensitive 
memory test. All in all, both Study 1 and Study 2 provide evidence that humans store detailed 
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representations in perceptual long-term memory without being (fully) aware of these 
memory abilities.  
However, how do the results fit with existing theoretical models of perceptual long-
term memory? Two models shall be considered here: the perceptual representation system 
(PRS) and the multiple-entry, modular memory system (MEM). The PRS (Schacter, 1990; 
Tulving & Schacter, 1990) is conceptualized as a largely non-conscious memory system for 
the perceptual, in contrast with the conceptual aspects of processed perceptual information. 
While the PRS does “process and represent information about the form and structure of 
words, objects, and other kinds of stimuli, [it does] not represent semantic or associative 
information about them” (Schacter, 1990, p. 550). As the PRS-framework points to the pos-
sibility of remembering perceptual information without conscious awareness, it can help ex-
plain the results of Study 2: Other than the less sensitive memory tests used in previous 
studies, the 2AFC used in Study 2 did not solely rely on the conscious processes of recollec-
tion and familiarity because participants were explicitly encouraged to guess and to go with 
their ‘gut feelings’ (see, e.g., Voss & Paller, 2010). Thus, Study 2 was able to detect non-
conscious memory representations as stored in the PRS. However, referring to the PRS-
framework is not sufficient for fully explaining the data of Study 1. Admittedly, one may 
argue that participants managed to perform significantly above chance on trials in which 
they had purely guessed, because they had non-conscious access to information stored in the 
PRS. However, in about one third of the trials, participants indicated that they had remem-
bered the correct answer, that is, that they had conscious access to the perceptual details that 
distinguished the two exemplars from one another. Crucially, participants were correct about 
their remember-judgment in the overwhelming majority of trials. Thus, it seems plausible to 
assume that they were aware of at least some of the information they had stored in perceptual 
long-term memory. 
A memory model that allows for both conscious and non-conscious perceptual long-
term memory representations is the MEM (Higgins & Johnson, 2012; Johnson, 1983; 2007; 
Johnson & Hirst, 1993). The MEM divides memory into four functional subsystems: two 
are perceptual subsystems (P-1 and P-2) while the other two are reflective subsystems (R-1 
and R-2). As the studies described here were concerned with perceptual long-term memory, 
only the two perceptual subsystems will be considered in more detail. P-1 processes include 
“locating stimuli, resolving stimulus configurations, tracking stimuli, and extracting invari-
ants from perceptual arrays” (Johnson & Hirst, 1993, p. 243) and typically operate below 
70 
 
conscious awareness. In contrast, we are typically aware of P-2 processes, which are in-
volved in “placing objects in spatial relation to each other, identifying objects, examining or 
perceptually investigating stimuli, and structuring or abstracting a pattern of organization 
across temporally extended stimuli” (Johnson & Hirst, 1993, p. 243). Put differently, P-1 
processes typically deal with perceptual features of our environment, while P-2 processes 
enable us to learn “about the conscious, phenomenal perceptual world of objects such as 
people, chairs and balls, events such as seeing a person sit down in a chair or catch a ball, 
and the relations among objects” (Johnson, 2007, p. 354; for an empirical demonstration of 
the dissociability of P-1 and P-2 processes, see Spachtholz & Kuhbandner, 2017). Thus, it 
seems legitimate to speculate that perceptual information that is stored as a result of P-1-
processing is represented in memory in the form of independent features, while perceptual 
information that is stored as a result of P-2 processing is represented in memory in the form 
of coherent objects (for an extended discussion of the storage format see section 3.3.2). 
Most importantly, the differentiation between P-1 and P-2 processes can help explain 
the results from Study 1 and Study 2. As far as Study 1 is concerned, the fact that participants 
performed significantly above chance even when indicating that they had purely guessed 
could be explained by assuming that participants used P-1 processes to give the correct an-
swer – processes they do not have conscious access to. In contrast, their performance on 
trials in which they indicated that they remembered the answer was arguably driven by P-2 
processes they were consciously aware of. Note, however, that these speculations cannot be 
proved with the present data, as it remains unclear how the metamemory judgments relate to 
the processes underlying the actual memory performance. That is, the metamemory judg-
ments may not necessarily mirror the underlying memory processes accurately. 
As described above, Study 2 found evidence for detailed long-term memory repre-
sentations for unattended, irrelevant and incidentally encoded auditory information, while 
previous studies had found null memory effects. This difference could be due to the fact that 
the recollection-and familiarity-based memory tests that were used in these previous studies 
required the participants to rely on P-2 processes, while the present study used a more sen-
sitive memory test in the sense that relying on P-1 processes was sufficient for giving a 
correct answer. Thus, the MEM seems to potentially provide a framework for understanding 
the results of the present studies. 
Note, however, that the present studies do not only fit with existing theories on per-
ceptual long-term memory such as the MEM and (partially) the PRS, but that they also ex-
tend the knowledge about this memory system by showing that the stored representations 
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are detailed, durable and created as a natural product of perception (i.e., even under inci-
dental encoding conditions and when the attentional resources are fully exhausted by a con-
current task). Put differently, the present studies allow for concluding that both the quantity 
and quality of perceptual information stored in perceptual long-term memory is higher than 
previously believed (see, e.g., Brady et al., 2008). 
 
3.2.2 How Is Perceptual Long-Term Memory Related to Implicit Memory? 
To consider the relation between perceptual long-term memory and implicit memory, let us 
begin with definitions. While the term ‘explicit memory’ is commonly used to describe the 
memory system for the conscious recollection of prior experiences, the term ‘implicit 
memory’ is meant to describe those memories one is not consciously aware of (for a brief 
overview see, e.g., Mulligan, 2003). Instead of speaking of explicit versus implicit memory, 
one may also speak of declarative versus non-declarative memory: While declarative 
memory can further be divided into semantic and episodic memory, non-declarative memory 
encompasses procedural skills and habits, priming and perceptual learning as well as simple 
classical conditioning and reflexes (see Squire, 2004). So how do these distinctions relate to 
perceptual long-term memory? 
 As described above, perceptual long-term memory comprises both explicit and im-
plicit memories. On the one hand, P-1 processing leads to memory representations one is 
unaware of, and which can thus be described as implicit; on the other hand, P-2 processing 
leads to memory representations one is typically aware of, and which should consequently 
be viewed as being explicit. Note, however, that just as not all perceptual memories are im-
plicit, not all implicit memories are perceptual. To understand this, simply consider the ex-
ample of semantic priming (for an overview see, e.g., Neely, 1991); that is, the observation 
that processing a prime (e.g., wolf) may facilitate the processing of a subsequent, semanti-
cally related target (e.g., dog). Thus, it seems that long-term memory representations can be 
either perceptual or conceptual, and at the same time either explicit or implicit. 
 When considering the results of the studies presented here, it was argued that perfor-
mance was probably driven by a combination of P-1 and P-2 processes, that is, a combination 
of explicit and implicit memory processes. Although this speculation seems plausible given 
the results of previous studies (see, e.g., Spachtholz & Kuhbandner, 2017) and fits with the 
existing memory models, the present data are insufficient for proving it. Thus, more research 
is needed to disentangle implicit and explicit perceptual memory processes in order to being 
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able to answer the question as to what drove memory performance in the tasks used in the 
present studies. 
 
3.2.3 Are the Stored Details Perceptual – and What Is a Perceptual Detail? 
In both Study 1 and Study 2, participants had to choose between two exemplars from the 
same basic-level category. To this end, Study 1 used everyday objects, while Study 2 used 
everyday sounds. It was argued that performing well on a 2AFC indicates that detailed per-
ceptual memory representations have been stored. However, two questions need to be asked 
to better understand the results. First, how can one be sure that the participants’ answers 
were driven by perceptual and not by verbal-conceptual knowledge? Second, what exactly 
does it mean that the stored memory representations were detailed? 
 At first glance, one may argue that the first question is easy to answer, as the fact that 
participants were at least partially unaware of their memory abilities clearly demonstrates 
that the stored information is represented on a perceptual rather than on a verbal-conceptual 
level. As described above, however, perceptual long-term memory is not necessarily 
memory without awareness. To use the MEM terminology: While P-2 processes are con-
scious, P-1 processes are not. Thus, one could rephrase the question as follows: How can 
one be sure that performance on trials in which participants were aware of their memory 
abilities was driven by perceptual rather than verbal-conceptual knowledge? The basic idea 
for disentangling perceptual and conceptual knowledge is simple: Performance was driven 
by perceptual and not by conceptual knowledge if the potentially available verbal-conceptual 
knowledge was not sufficient for distinguishing between the two stimuli.  
As the pairs of objects in Study 1 and sounds in Study 2 belonged to the same basic-
level category, simply remembering this basic-level category (“I touched a pen”, “I heard 
the humming of a refrigerator”) was insufficient for giving a correct response in the memory 
test. However, one may argue that participants created meaningfully different subtypes by 
verbally recoding the presented stimuli so that no detailed perceptual knowledge was neces-
sary for distinguishing the two objects of a pair. Take the basic category item ‘pen’, for 
instance: Participants could define subordinate categories such as ‘click-ballpoint pen’ ver-
sus ‘simple ballpoint pen’ in order to differentiate between the two objects of a pair. In case 
they used this strategy, the argument goes, memory performance would be driven by con-
ceptual and not by perceptual knowledge. However, this line of reasoning is flawed for sev-
eral reasons.  
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Since the exemplars had to be distinguishable, the creation of ‘subtypes’ is theoreti-
cally possible ad infinitum as long as ‘subtype’ is defined by the differing attribute. Think 
of the pen example: Even when using two click ballpoints, subtypes like ‘click ballpoint with 
a metal clip’ versus ‘click ballpoint with a plastic clip’ can be formed; and even when using 
two click ballpoints with metal clips, the subtypes of ‘click ballpoint with a slightly curved 
metal clip’ versus ‘click ballpoint with a straight metal clip’ can be formed, and so on. Hence, 
the existence of subtypes is not a problem per se, but a fundamental principle on which 
recognition memory is based. Rather, it seems important to rule out the possibility that par-
ticipants indeed used verbalization strategies to remember the stimuli. 
As far as Study 1 is concerned, it is possible that participants have formed complex 
verbal descriptions during encoding in Experiment 1. Simply put, participants may have ver-
bally recoded the haptic information in a way that enabled them to give the correct answer 
in the subsequent memory test (“I touched a click ballpoint with a slightly curved metal clip” 
versus “I touched a click ballpoint with a straight metal clip”). Crucially, however, inten-
tional memorization strategies were ruled out in Experiment 2 by using an incidental encod-
ing task. This makes it quite unlikely that participants formed complex verbal descriptions 
during encoding beyond basic-level categories, especially as the basic-level categories used 
in the present study corresponded to the granularity of everyday categories. Although inten-
tional memorization strategies were ruled out, participants still performed far above chance. 
As the sounds were not only unattended, irrelevant, and incidentally encoded, but also rap-
idly presented in a continuous auditory stream in Study 2, the problem of verbal-semantic 
recoding does not arise. Thus, it seems that performance in both Study 1 and Study 2 was 
indeed driven by perceptual and not by verbal-conceptual knowledge about the stimuli – no 
matter whether participants were aware or unaware of their memory abilities on a given trial. 
This brings us to the second question: Although the results of the present studies 
indicate that perceptual long-term memory stores detailed memory representations, it would 
be interesting to know how detailed the perceptual memory representations in fact are. To 
begin with, it is important to acknowledge that the similarity at the perceptual level was not 
varied systematically in the present studies. This is simply because it is hard to see how such 
a systematic variation could be accomplished. To understand why, consider the following 
example: Assume that you have a pair of hammers and a pair of belts. Further assume that 
one of the hammers is slightly newer than the other so that its surface is smoother; as far as 
the belts are concerned, one is a bit thicker and the form of the buckle is different. How could 
one determine whether the two hammers are more similar or less similar than the two belts? 
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There are two options: (1) asking participants for subjective similarity ratings and (2) trying 
to quantify the similarity psychophysically.  
Although collecting subjective similarity ratings may seem like an easy way out, it 
is in fact not, for the simple reason that it would remain completely unclear on what basis 
participants make their similarity judgments, and whether their consciously made similarity 
judgments have anything to do with the differences and similarities that are extracted on a 
perceptual level. Trying to quantify the similarity of everyday objects as used in Study 1 or 
everyday sounds as used in Study 2 is also non-trivial. First, stimulus material taken from 
everyday life differs along many different dimensions: the everyday objects used in Study 1 
differ regarding weight, form, texture, hardness, and elasticity, for instance, while the eve-
ryday sounds in Study 2 may differ regarding harmonicity, variation, rhythm, and so on. 
Even if one could measure these different stimulus properties independently, it remains un-
clear how these different measurements could be integrated into a single similarity score that 
is in line with the participants’ perceptions. It is possible, for instance, that quantitatively 
small variations may lead to qualitatively big differences regarding the perceived similarity 
(see also the discussion of Study 2). 
 As this discussion makes clear, it is almost impossible to quantify the similarity of 
two everyday objects or everyday sounds. Thus, the present studies cannot answer the ques-
tion as to how detailed the representations stored in perceptual long-term memory actually 
are. Exploring this question using laboratory-generated stimuli seems a promising avenue 
for further research. However, the advantages of using stimuli taken from everyday life 
should not be underestimated. When asking how many of the perceptual experiences that we 
make day in and day out are stored in perceptual long-term memory, it seems straightforward 
to use objects or sounds that are actually part of everyday experience. Stimuli taken from 
everyday life have an ecological validity that cannot be achieved using laboratory-generated 
stimuli. 
 
3.2.4 The Beautiful Complexity of Our Senses 
Our perceptual world is not only and probably not even predominantly a visual one – alt-
hough people tend to believe that vision is their most important sense, and although most 
research on the different senses is research on vision. We are part of a rich perceptual envi-
ronment and we constantly perceive information through all of our senses. While recent 
studies on visual long-term memory have demonstrated that not only a high quantity of in-
formation is stored, but also that the stored representations are highly detailed (e.g., Brady 
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et al., 2008; Vogt & Magnussen, 2007), comparably little was known about perceptual long-
term memory for the other sensory modalities. Thus, it remained unclear as to how well the 
rich perceptual environment is retained in perceptual long-term memory in a multisensory 
way. The evidence presented here can help to clarify this issue. While Study 1 demonstrates 
that the results found for visual long-term memory also hold true for haptic long-term 
memory, Study 2 shows accurate memory for perceptual details of auditory information. 
Taken together, Study 1 and Study 2 point to the importance of research on the non-visual 
senses: Fully capturing the richness and diversity of perceptual long-term memory is only 
possible when taking into account the contributions of all of the different senses. 
 These empirically motivated insights from Studies 1 and 2 are backed up by the con-
siderations presented in Study 3: Other than what one may intuitively think, it is not clear 
that vision is indeed the most important and most complex sense. Rather, Study 3 supports 
the notion that the different senses capture different aspects of our environment and perform 
qualitatively different functions. Although – or maybe especially because – vision plays a 
prominent role in our everyday life and our Western societies are visual societies, a call for 
diversity seems well justified. Exclusively focusing on vision may lead to a one-sided and 
impoverished view of perception and memory. 
 At the same time, it is important to note that our senses hardly act independently 
outside the world of well-controlled laboratory settings. Normally, several senses are stim-
ulated at the same time, leading to a perceptual experience that is perceived as a whole. For 
instance, I could not only see the craftsmen unloading materials from their van in front of 
my office, I could also hear them. I heard how they were pushing their toolboxes across the 
van’s load floor and I heard a metallic sound of different tools bumping against each other 
when the toolbox was put to the ground. If I had opened the window, I also would have 
smelled the cigarette that one of the craftsmen was smoking. In other words, the perceptual 
experience of observing the craftsmen consists of the concurrent stimulation of several 
senses. Thus, the results of the studies presented here are not only a call for diversity, but at 
the same time also a call for integration and for considering multisensory interactions (see 
the discussion of Study 3). This can also be made clear by taking another look at Study 1 
and the fact that performance in the crossmodal visual test was almost as good as perfor-
mance in the unimodal haptic test. Although it is possible that the participants retrieved the 
haptic representations from memory and converted them into a visual format for the cross-
modal memory test, it is also possible that the representations that were created in the en-
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coding phase were rather amodal than haptic per se. Interestingly, recent brain-imaging stud-
ies support the second option, indicating that visual representations are automatically co-
activated when haptically exploring objects (see Snow et al., 2014; Lacey & Sathian, 2014; 
see also the discussion of Study 1). 
 Understanding the complexity and multidimensionality of our senses is a challenging 
undertaking. However, ignoring it most certainly leads to theoretical models of perception 
and memory, which systematically underestimate the abilities of perceptual long-term 
memory and which are unable to capture the richness of the perceptual experiences that we 
permanently make. 
 
3.3 Open Questions 
The three studies described and discussed in this thesis open up new questions for future 
research, of which two shall be discussed in more detail in the next sections. First, not all 
incoming information seems to be stored in perceptual long-term memory – or at least not 
equally detailed. So what are the selection mechanisms that help us to distinguish between 
information that needs to be stored in high fidelity on the one hand and information that is 
less relevant on the other hand, if, as described above, the contents stored in perceptual long-
term memory are only loosely tied to our current goals and intentions? Second, Studies 1 
and 2 demonstrate that participants stored detailed long-term memory representations, as 
they were able to give the correct answer in memory tests that require considerably detailed 
memory representations to do so. However, what is the storage format of these detailed long-
term memory representations? 
 
3.3.1 Selection Mechanisms in Perceptual Long-Term Memory 
The results of Study 1 and Study 2 show that detailed representations are stored in perceptual 
long-term memory. Although participants remembered the haptically explored objects re-
markably well in Study 1, no matter whether memory was tested immediately after explora-
tion or after one week, no matter whether participants knew that their memory would be 
tested or encoding was incidental, and no matter whether memory was tested in a unimodal 
or crossmodal memory test, their memory was not perfect. That is, participants did not re-
member all objects with the amount of detail required to distinguish between the two exem-
plars in a 2AFC. This pattern becomes even more obvious in Study 2. The fact that partici-
pants gave the correct answer in 57% of the trials in the immediate and 56% of the trials in 
the delayed memory test effectively means that participants remembered 14% and 12% of 
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the sounds respectively.5 In other words, 86% of the sounds in the immediate test and 88% 
of the sounds in the delayed test were not remembered correctly. What do these numbers 
mean? 
 Above all, these numbers do not mean that all objects that the participants remem-
bered incorrectly in the 2AFC were forgotten. First, successfully distinguishing between the 
two exemplars from the same basic-level category required detailed knowledge about the 
sounds. In a similar study (Kuhbandner et al., 2017), it was demonstrated that performance 
was much better when less similar pairs of stimuli were used, indicating that more stimuli 
are stored in perceptual long-term memory albeit in less detail. Put in plain words, partici-
pants may not remember the humming of a refrigerator with enough detail to distinguish it 
from the humming of another refrigerator, but could still be able to indicate that they heard 
the humming of a refrigerator rather than the humming of an air conditioner, or at least that 
they heard the humming of a refrigerator rather than a bird singing. Second, although the 
2AFC used in the present studies is – in contrast to an ONR, for instance – sensitive enough 
to detect detailed memories that the participants are not aware of, there could be other, even 
more sensitive memory tests potentially leading to even better performance. In this context, 
it is important to understand that the memory effects observed in Study 2 were actually not 
small – contrary to what one may initially think when hearing that about one in ten sounds 
was remembered correctly (see also the discussion of Study 2). In Study 2, the sounds were 
unattended, irrelevant, and incidentally encoded. That is, from a methodological point of 
view, everything was done to make successfully remembering the sounds as difficult as pos-
sible. Remember also, that previous studies have found null memory effects under such con-
ditions. Thus, the results should be interpreted the other way around: Although the presented 
sounds were unattended, irrelevant, and incidentally encoded, participants still formed de-
tailed perceptual long-term memory representations for about a tenth of them. In fact, storing 
detailed perceptual long-term memory representations of even a fraction of the incoming 
perceptual information challenges existing models of human memory and perception. 
 As the numbers described above neither mean that the memory effect was small, nor 
that unsuccessfully remembered stimuli were forgotten, one can repeat the question posed 
above with new emphasis: What do these numbers mean? Summed up in one sentence, the 
                                                          
5 Correct responses in a 2AFC include fortunate guesses. To correct for the effects of random 
guessing, the observed percentage correct (PCObserved) can be converted into an adjusted per-
centage correct score (PCAdjusted), using the formula PCAdjusted = 2 * PCObserved – 100. PCAdjusted 
estimates how often participants truly remembered a stimulus, after accounting for fortunate 
guesses (for details, see Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2013). 
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results of the present studies demonstrate that not all stimuli were remembered equally well 
and that some were stored with the amount of detail required for distinguishing two stimuli 
from the same basic-level category, while others were not. The question is: Why? Why were 
some stimuli stored in higher fidelity than others? What are the selection mechanisms that 
decide whether a stimulus is stored in high fidelity? At first, one may think that the results 
were possibly driven by certain stimuli characteristics that made the stimuli more or less 
memorable. Interestingly, however, above-chance performance in Study 2 was not driven by 
a few specific sounds. Instead, memory performance across the different sounds was nor-
mally distributed. That is not to say that stimuli characteristics do not play a role when it 
comes to storing information in perceptual long-term memory. On the contrary, exploring 
the role of stimulus characteristics in forming perceptual long-term memory seems to be a 
promising topic for future research. If the results of the present studies cannot be explained 
by specific stimuli properties, however, what else could be potential selection mechanisms? 
 One possible explanation is provided by the so-called ‘attentional boost effect’ (e.g., 
Swallow & Jiang, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2014; for a review, see Swallow & Jiang, 2013). In the 
typical attentional boost paradigm, participants perform two concurrent but unrelated tasks. 
One task is to view a series of images and to remember them for a later memory test. The 
other, concurrently executed task is to press a button when a target (e.g., a red square) ap-
pears in a series of distractors (e.g., squares of different colors). Although the two tasks are 
completely unrelated, memory performance for images that were paired with a target in the 
concurrent task were remembered better in a subsequent memory test than those that were 
not. It is argued that this attentional boost effect is best understood as a processing enhance-
ment, that is, “that the selection of behaviorally relevant events in time produces brief, but 
broad, enhancements in perceptual processing, thereby facilitating the processing of the tar-
get and concurrent, but unrelated, background images” (Swallow & Jiang, 2014, p. 1298). 
There are two possibilities as to what a ‘behaviorally relevant event in time’ could be: either 
perceiving a target stimulus while concurrently viewing an image or providing a response to 
a target stimulus while concurrently viewing an image. Assume that the window of my office 
was open when observing the craftsmen, and further assume that one of them lights a ciga-
rette, for instance. The behaviorally relevant event in time could either be the moment in 
which I smell the smoke (i.e., the moment in which I perceive the stimulus) or the moment 
in which I stand up and close the window, because I do not like the smell of cigarettes (i.e., 
the moment in which I respond to the stimulus). However, the existing studies on the atten-
tional boost effect do not differentiate between these options, as the stimulus that participants 
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see when a target appears is always also the stimulus that participants respond to. Thus, 
exploring whether the enhancement by the attentional boost effect is stimulus-based or re-
sponse-based seems to be an interesting topic for future research. 
 Another potential selection mechanism can be derived from research in the field of 
task-irrelevant perceptual learning (for reviews, see Seitz & Watanabe, 2005; Seitz & Dinse, 
2007; Watanabe & Sasaki, 2015). As the name already suggests, task-irrelevant perceptual 
learning describes the phenomenon that perceptual learning occurs even for aspects of the 
perceptual environment that are not relevant to the present task. Many efforts have been 
made to clarify under which conditions task-irrelevant learning can occur. While it was ini-
tially believed, for example, that task-irrelevant perceptual learning can only occur when it 
is linked to active, goal-directed behavior, it has been demonstrated “that visual learning can 
be formed in human adults through stimulus-reward pairing in the absence of a task and 
without awareness of the stimulus presentation or reward contingencies” (Seitz et al., 2009, 
p. 700). Thus, further investigating the role of reward contingencies in the forming of per-
ceptual long-term memory representations is another possible topic for future research. 
To sum up, given the results of the present studies, the question arises as to what the 
potential selection mechanisms could be that are responsible for deciding which stimulus is 
stored in high fidelity in perceptual long-term memory, and which is not. Although there 
may be certain stimulus characteristics that make some stimuli more memorable than others, 
such a mechanism cannot explain the results described here. Thus, there have to be other 
selection mechanisms. Two potential ideas were discussed here: the attentional boost effect 
and the role of rewards. 
 
3.3.2 The Storage Format of Perceptual Long-Term Memory Representations 
From a theoretical point of view, it seems that perceptual information can be stored in at 
least two ways: as independent features or as coherent, bound objects (see Spachtholz & 
Kuhbandner, 2017). At lower sensory-perceptual levels of the processing hierarchy, sensory 
information from the senses is analyzed along several basic dimensions. Based on this anal-
ysis, feature-based representations are created and stored that accurately mirror the physical 
properties of the original sensory input. At higher sensory-perceptual levels, the independent 
features are integrated into coherent objects. This is done by removing redundant sensory-
perceptual information and by recoding the feature-based representations so that they fit with 
the perceptual model of the world that we constructed based on prior learning experiences 
(e.g., Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Serences & Yantis, 2006). 
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Such a distinction between feature-based and object-based representations in long-
term memory as proposed and demonstrated by Spachtholz and Kuhbandner (2017) clearly 
resembles the difference between P-1 and P-2 processes in the MEM-framework (see above, 
section 3.2.1). While P-1 processes can be described as leading to feature-based representa-
tions, P-2 processes seem to result in object-based representations. Although the studies pre-
sented here did not explicitly investigate in which format the detailed memory representa-
tions were stored and although more research is needed to disentangle P-1 and P-2 processes 
as well as feature-based and object-based representations, it is interesting to deliberate as to 
whether the results of the present studies can be understood from the perspective of such a 
framework. 
As discussed above, one may speculate that performance in Study 1 was arguably 
driven by non-conscious P-1 processes on guess trials and at least partially driven by con-
scious P-2 processes on remember trials. Assuming that P-1 processes are linked to feature-
based representations, while P-2 processes are linked to object-based representations, one 
could further speculate that performance in the memory test was the result of a combination 
of feature-based and object-based perceptual representations. The situation for Study 2 is 
slightly different: As hypothesized above, the 2AFC used in the present study differs from 
the previously used ONR insofar as the 2AFC is sensitive to non-conscious P-1 processes, 
while an ONR requires conscious access to the stored perceptual information and is thus 
sensitive to P-2, but not to P-1 processes. Following the line of thought presented here, the 
fact that a test is needed that is sensitive to P-1 processes to find above-chance performance 
for unattended, irrelevant and incidentally encoded perceptual information suggests that par-
ticipants stored feature-based, but not object-based representations of the everyday sounds. 
This conclusion is in line with the widely held belief that attention is a necessary precondi-
tion for creating object-based representations (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
All in all, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 do not only fit well with the distinction 
between P-1 and P-2 processes, but also with the idea that P-1 processes are linked to feature-
based representations, while P-2 processes are linked to object-based representations. Thus, 
it indeed seems to be an interesting topic for future research to further investigate these the-
oretical distinctions. Apart from distinguishing the different processes and associated types 
of representation, it would also be fascinating to know more about possible interactions be-
tween the different instances. 
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3.4 Possible Applications 
The results of the present studies suggest that humans possess a detailed perceptual long-
term memory with an (in principle) unlimited storage capacity. In particular, storing infor-
mation in perceptual long-term memory seems to be an effortless process and a natural prod-
uct of perception. If this is true, however, exploring how this memory system can be used in 
real-world settings seems promising. In other words, the results of the present studies are not 
only relevant from the perspective of basic research, but could also have implications for 
designing practical applications and for fostering educational processes. The following two 
sections tentatively explore two fields in which interventions and programs based on per-
ceptual memory skills could potentially turn out to be beneficial: (1) the broad field of learn-
ing and knowledge acquisition and (2) the case of people with dementia. 
 
3.4.1 Learning and Knowledge Acquisition 
According to the MEM framework (see section 3.2.1), perceptual information is not only 
passively stored in perceptual long-term memory, but also actively used for learning or, more 
precisely, for adjusting our behavior. As Johnson (2007) puts it, “learning via P-1 processes 
allows us to adjust to a person’s accent or to anticipate the trajectory of a baseball”, while 
learning via P-2 processes means – as already quoted above – “learning about the conscious, 
phenomenal perceptual world of objects […], events […], and the relations among objects” 
(p. 354). Thus, one may speculate that storing detailed memory representations in perceptual 
long-term memory as a natural product of perception is not simply a peculiarity of human 
cognition, but a functional mechanism that supports the fine-tuning of motor actions (e.g. 
grabbing a glass from a shelf without letting it slip, hitting a perfect tennis backhand down 
the line, etc.). As the present studies only show that detailed representations are stored in 
perceptual long-term memory, but do not allow for any conclusions regarding the function-
ality of such a memory system, more research is needed to investigate how perceptual long-
term memory contributes to our behavior. 
 However, one may take the speculations even one step further and hypothesize that 
perceptual long-term memory does not only help improving perceptual skills, but also per-
formance on complex cognitive tasks. That is, perceptual long-term memory may help fos-
tering the acquisition of semantic-conceptual knowledge. Although such a speculation may 
initially seem a bit far-fetched, it is supported by constructivist theories of situated cognition, 
which claim – broadly speaking – that knowledge is not passively transmitted but actively 
and individually constructed under the specific conditions of a given environment (see, e.g., 
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Gerstenmaier & Mandl, 1995; Knuth & Cunningham, 1993; Mandl & Gerstenmaier, 2000). 
In particular, theories of situated cognition hold that properly acquiring semantic-conceptual 
knowledge is bound to having the opportunity to connect this highly abstract and symbolic 
knowledge to real-world experiences (e.g. Resnick, 1987). Under such a perspective, includ-
ing perceptual experiences in educational settings is an important precondition for 
knowledge acquisition. Interestingly, the hypothesis that perceptual learning may improve 
performance in complex cognitive tasks was tested in the context of knowledge acquisition 
in mathematics (see, e.g., Kellman, Massey, & Son, 2009; Landy & Goldstone, 2007). The 
basic idea is that dealing with mathematical problems crucially depends “on pattern recog-
nition and fluent processing of structure, as well as mapping across transformations (e.g., in 
algebra) and across multiple representations (e.g., graphs and equations)” (Kellman & Mas-
sey, 2013, p. 125) and that these abilities can be fostered by perceptual learning. 
 In addition, consider another, completely different example: teaching anatomy to 
medical students. A proper understanding of human anatomy requires both semantic-con-
ceptual knowledge and an accurate three-dimensional mental representation of the anatom-
ical structures (see, e.g., Keenan & ben Awadh, 2019). Against this background, further fos-
tering the physical, that is visual and haptic interaction with anatomical parts in addition to 
learning about anatomical structures by memorizing annotated, two-dimensional illustra-
tions in anatomy atlases has become an important goal of methods developed in recent years 
(for a theoretical account, see Keehner & Lowe, 2010; for a practical implementation see 
Reid, Shapiro, & Louw, 2019). In particular, these approaches hypothesize that generating 
perceptual experiences through the multi-sensory observation of anatomical structures does 
not only improve perceptual and dexterity skills, but also allows for the semantic-conceptual 
understanding of anatomical structures. 
 All in all, it seems legitimate to speculate that storing detailed representations in per-
ceptual long-term memory as a natural product of perception has a functional value and can 
consequently be used in educational settings. Crucially, perceptual long-term memory may 
not only contribute to perceptual, but also to semantic-conceptual learning. Note, however, 
that the results of the present studies cannot prove these speculations. Rather, they provide 
a starting point for future investigations. 
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3.4.2 Dementia 
Although there are huge differences between the various forms of dementia, memory loss is 
a key characteristic in all of them. Interestingly, semantic-conceptual memories seem to be 
more affected by the disease than perceptual memories (see, e.g., Fleischman, Wilson, Ga-
brieli, Schneider, Bienias, & Bennett, 2005; Harrison, Son, Kim, & Whall, 2007; for a phil-
osophical account, see, e.g., Fuchs, 2018; for an in-depth discussion of the issues presented 
in the following paragraphs, see Hutmacher, 2020). In this context, Fuchs (2018) argues that 
people with dementia still have access to an extremely rich and embodied inner perceptual 
world – even in the later stages of the disease, and although they may have lost many of their 
explicit and especially many of their semantic-conceptual memory skills. If this were true, 
this would open up at least two interesting possibilities. 
 First, in case people with dementia indeed still possess detailed memories about their 
past, albeit not in semantic-conceptual, but rather in perceptual form, one could try to base 
interactions on these remaining perceptual memories. Put differently, people with dementia 
may profit in terms of well-being from perceptual stimulation that is in line with their previ-
ous experiences as well as their current preferences (for reviews, see Sánchez, Millán-
Calenti, Lorenzo-López, & Masseda, 2013; Strøm, Ytrehus, & Grov, 2016). Although this 
idea sounds promising, it has repeatedly been noted that many of the studies conducted so 
far lacked methodological rigor and that there are many interventions for which it remains 
unclear whether they are actually effective (Sánchez et al., 2013; Strøm et al., 2016). Thus, 
further investigating what aspects of perceptual long-term memory are preserved in people 
with dementia and how these perceptual memories can be accessed in everyday interactions 
seems to be a promising topic for future research, also in light of the results of the studies 
presented here, which show how rich and detailed perceptual long-term memory is in healthy 
subjects. 
 Second, in case people with dementia not only possess detailed memories about their 
past, but are also able to learn new skills using their remaining perceptual memory abilities, 
this would open up many possibilities in dementia care. In fact, people with dementia seem 
to show intact habit learning (see, e.g., Eldridge, Masterman, & Knowlton, 2002) such as 
learning new dance moves (Rösler, Seifritz, Kräuchi, Spoerl, Brokuslaus, Proserpi, Gendre, 
Savaskan, & Hofmann, 2002). In fact, it has become quite common in recent years to base 
the conception of environments and interventions for people with dementia on perceptual 
qualities (see, e.g., Davis, Byers, Nay, & Koch, 2009; Marquardt & Schmieg, 2009; Mitch-
ell, Burton, & Raman, 2004; Mitchell, Burton, Raman, Blackman, Jenks, & Williams, 2003). 
84 
 
Feddersen (2014) describes, for instance, why it is important to consider the fact that people 
with dementia focus on the perceptual rather than on the semantic-conceptual aspects of their 
environment when designing nursing homes:  
For people with dementia, sensory experiences play a central role. This applies espe-
cially to how we experience space. […] When we design architecture for people with 
dementia, we must therefore take a step back and consider what is fundamental about 
the spaces we live in. (p. 15) 
However, to date, the way perceptual memory and perceptual learning function in people 
with dementia is still not completely understood, although suggestions have been made and 
research has been conducted (see, e.g., Fleischman et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2007). In 
particular, it remains unclear (1) whether the perceptual skills of people with dementia are 
comparable to the perceptual skills of healthy human beings or whether they are simply less 
impaired than their semantic-conceptual skills and (2) what exactly the perceptual qualities 
are that people with dementia use to orient themselves in their environment. Thus, system-
atically investigating perceptual memory in people with dementia seems to be an important 
goal for future research, as it may deepen the understanding of the disease and inform the 
development of real-world applications. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
I am almost done now. These are the last sentences of my thesis. Thus, I take a short break 
to contemplate the moment. It is quite late already. My colleague has left the office about an 
hour ago. As the students are heading home from university, it is slowly getting calm and 
silent around me. The world outside the window starts fading into darkness. I wonder: What 
can be learned from this dissertation after all? What is the bottom line? As there is no one 
around to answer the question for me, I do it myself: The bottom line is that the world outside 
the window is actually not fading into darkness. While sitting at my desk, I have not only 
written this thesis, but also processed and stored a lot of perceptual information. I have seen 
the tree close to my window, the branches and leaves gently dancing in the wind, I have seen 
parked cars and parts of the university buildings, I have seen people passing by and crafts-
men unloading materials from their van. I have felt the warmth of the cup of coffee in my 
hands, I have written several pages of notes with various pens, pressed a lot of keys on the 
keyboard, and tried to ignore the conversation my colleague had with a student. Subjectively, 
I may have the impression that most incoming perceptual information is either not processed 
at all or rapidly forgotten. In fact, however, it seems that storing information in perceptual 
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long-term memory is an effortless and natural product of perception. Beyond the world of 
rational, semantic, and conceptual information, I am consciously aware of, there is a world 
full of detailed perceptual memories from all my senses I may not – or at least not always – 
have conscious access to, but which nevertheless helps me guide and adjust my behavior in 
everyday life. 
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